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I NTdO DUC'rioN

The Third Reich of Germany was born in revolution.

It had

to secure its position in a new and victorious Germany, but
i also to found its roots

i
.

I

de~p in~ Ger~an

culture.

The SS was a huge organ1zat1on whose power extended into

every aspect of German life, and this paper will show that

!.
~

~

I

because of its size and organization, it controlled the State

.~ machinery by the end of the war.
!

To do this, the various

branches of the SS must be examined to see if its personnel
could keep an accurate pulse and eye on the people; it must ·be
determined whether the NSDAP could offer any resistance, whether ..
the use of naked power for a seizure of the State's machinery

was feasible and who or what organizations could effectively
oppose the .SS if 1 t wished to act in any field •.

This paper will be descriptive to a.large degree, at least,·~(.
until the conclusion, for it is only by seeing the extent of
the SS, both physically and psychologically, that we can
realize its power.

11

CHAPTER I
BEGINNINGS OF THE SS
The SS grew out of the SA or/Assault Sections headed by
Ernst Rohm.

Originally .formed as squads of men who were to beat

up and terrorize political opponents, Rohm saw the SA as it grew
in strength, as the future
Socialist ideology.

Germa~

Army steeped in the National

To Hohm and his lieutenants, the SA was a

trained manpower reserve for the RelchsW'ehrl and he Qften spoke
of ·someday absorbing the Reichswehr into the SA.

Bitler however, '

because of his precarious position,. did' not want to antagonize
the Army who while not giving him active support in the begin· ning, at

~east

did not move against him.

Hitler was also wor-

ried about the enormous size of the SA and its continual grumblings.

For him, the SA was merely a tool which he used in a

variety of ways and which also served as a rallying point for
lower class, traditionalist Germans.

The uniforms, banners,

marches, etc. could all serve as points of reference in a chaotic world.

At no time did Hitler envision the SA as replacing

the Reichswehr.2

As time went on, Hitler realized that the

1J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power; The German
MacMillan and Co., 1964),

Army in Politics, i918-45 (London:
p. 264.
2Ibid., p. 203-4.
1

,.L
r,o;;::<,,._,,

2

.'

,_,~·.>.t~-,~····;~·-

, unpredictable character of the SA and the ambitious Rohm were
negative factors in his dealings with the Reichswehr who saw the
1
~

~ .

SA

as a threat, and with the middle and upper-classes who saw

the SA as hoodlums and street rabble.

ti

To counter the SA, Hitler could not use the Army who never
the less was exerting pressure c:>.n..

Hi~l~r;...to

limit the SA.

Hitler1

thus turned to the Schultzstaffeln (SS) under the direction of

t

4

I

Himmler.

Out of an organization of 280 men, Himmler had gradual-;

f ly built up an organization which numbered in the tens of thou-

..

1

i
i,.
1

!.'

t

sands.

The purpose of this formation was to. create originally,

an: organization, ."• •• compcsed of the best physically, the most

dependable, and the most :faithful men in -the Nazi movement." J
It is this organization which with the passive aid of the Army,
decapitated the leadership of the SA in the famous "Night of the
Long Knives."

It is with the Rohm Purge that the order which

Himmler had been dreaming of for

~o

long ,pegan to take shape.

3George H. Stein, The Waffen-SS; Hitler's Elite Guard at
War, 1939-42 (London1 Oxford University Press, 1966), P• mi •
.• '

l
~

CHAPTER II
PURPOSE OF THE SS
On November 7, 1930, Hitler wrote that, "The task of the
f SS is primarily to carry ou't po11ce duties within the Party,

11

4

i

As time went on, however, the concept and role of the SS was in
a constant state of flux, until Hitler reached the stage where
•
the SS was the onlyprganization he trusted. Both Hitler and
Himmler saw the SS as a double-edged sword;
••• an unconditional tool in the hands of the Fuhrer
for the implementationof the true aims of his policy--the safeguarding of an eternal sovere~gn life
of the Germanic-German Reich by settlement-conquest
on the one hand, by annihilation qf the mortal enemy on the other; but at the same time also the highest goal of this policy, as that racial nucleus of
the best that is, soldier-peasant-blood destined to
be the ruling class of the Reich.5
The idea of a ruling elite was closely linked to the phil- !
osophy of the Reich concerning the superiority of the Aryans and:
\

.the myth of Blood and Soil.

This idea briefly held that the

Aryans were the choosen people and that to. maintain their purity'·
they must not associate with the non-Aryans; they must also be
4Heinz Hohne, The Orde~ of the Death's Head; The Story of
Hitler's SS (New York: Goward-McCann Inc., 1966), p. 58-9.
5Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New Yorks
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 393.
·

Holt,

4

~..<:r,,..;m;'JIO:::l~li'>'.>"'"<~· .,~
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'
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·~

,, ...::o. ..

~..,.,.,,..._'7":h"•··"·"' ~

>;;1~·:~~'"-:'t<.~:t:.~~.,.r,oL'"'1l'?:'f'[·.""'fi'-'¥':·..;:;~"~·~1\'il,i~ ·~1··,· ~i."r&:«~~""rc,--~·~·-~·..:<·.~..... ,·..!'..-..;<•-T:'"O"-'

and maintain a soldier-peasant attitude.

-~~z-..r.r,.....~:.·~~1'>.l>.·".l

·,· "-'" ,,.>f.:·

To Himmler's

"~ ·.rt~'l"'l"r ,,•· ,.,:,

th1nkin~,

the soldier-peasant was the ideal t?ward which he strove, and
the SS was to fulfill this role •. The SS was to be a new order,

f

an order which would embody e. tradition so that it could;

'

•••• march forward into the future young and strong,
revolutionary and efficient, to fulfill the task
of giving the German People, the superstructure of
society which will eo~bine and hold together this
German People and this Europe, and from which the
brains the people need for industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen, and·techn1c1ans
will emerge. 6 ·

tj

i

..

In an address to German Army Officers,
forced Himmler's words.

During a

.Hitl~r

sp~ech

echoed and rein-

Hitler said that the

'f
t Greater German Reich would include individuals who are not well
~

f

disposed towards the Reich .and that thereforJ!, a State military

I police would be necessary to keep them in line.

This task could

not be left to any group however, but rather could only be carried out by;
•••• a State Police which has with.in its ranks men
of the best Germa.n blood and which identifies itself unreservedly with the 1deolosi;y at the base of
the Greater German Reich ••• such a-formation---proud
of its racial puritY---will never fraternize with
the proletaria.t and w1 th the underworld which undermines the fundamental idea ••• Return1ng home after
having proved themselves in the field, the units of
the Waffen-SS will possess the authority to execute
their tasks as State Pol1ce.7

u.s.

Gove~nment

Printing Office, 19

?Allan Bullock, Hitler; A Study in Tyranny (London:
Odhams Press Ltd., 1952), p. 640.

5

.

haired, blue eyed individuals who could rule the Reich and be a

t
t

}iving proof of Germanic superiority.

Himmler believed that

every State nzeded an elite who could lead the way for the
mn.sses.

Himmler took the vi-ewthat;

The SS 1·ms to provide the elite, the constructive
political force 1.n the National Socialist state.That could only come about if its members brought
to the social requirements of the present day the
genuine military tradition, the distinctive outlook, bearing and bre.ed1ng ..,of the German nobility,
the knowledge, ability and creative efficiency of
the industrialists and the profundity of German,·
scholarship, on a basis c;>f racial selection.8
~

~
i

Some scholars often debate the point that the philosophy

L which

•

Hitler espoused in

M~in

Kampf was merely a sugar coating

.

for the masses and that he was primarily interested with the
acquisition of and maintenance of his personal pol-rer.

A look

at his concern for the destruction of the Jews, the war against
the Soviet Union, and his views concerning the SS will disprove
that viewpoint.

Hitler came to view the SS as his personal tool

and he had complete faith in the SS.

Perhaps if Reinhardt Hey-

drich had been able to replace Himmler, Hitler would have displayed more caution, yet because Himmler displayed more interest
in organizational matter, Hitler exhibited complete confidence
This confidence was reflected during the war by his

v
~.

in the SS.

ft

orders that the "SS Fire Brigade" on the Eastern Front receive

~

f
~

I

8i!illi Frischauer, Himmler; The Evil Genius of the Third

R.eich (Boston:

Beacon Press;-1953), p. 245.

I

6
. "

For the future Hitler said;
.
!5

I do not doubt for a moment, despite certain people's
scepticis;n, that within a hundred or so years frpm
now, all the Ger:-nan elite will be a product of the
ss--for only tbe ss· practices racial selection. 9

~

l

i Be~ause Hftler firmly believ·ed

in the racial policy which he

i

spoke of, the Aryans, "constituted an elite within the nation," · · i

I•

and these Aryans were, .. represented by the Nazi Party and espe-

!

cially by the SS."

'I

Hitler often referred to the Nazi.seizure of

power as a racial revolution,

11

since it represented the replace-

ment of. one ruling caste by anotber. ulO

I

t

Himmler took great e·fforts to insure that the SS men

i remained,, aloof from soc,.~t'y in genera.1--excel>t for the Gestapo

I
~
!

i

and SD divisions--so that their elite character would be rein-

I
! forced.
~

~

Bim.mler also

att~mpted

to.make the SS organization

financially independent by soliciting funds from the tndustrial-

t

~·

~

~

'f

ists, the old nobility.and by setting up separate SS industries.
Hitler went along with this idea of separateness when he saidr
As soon as peace has returned, the SS will have -to
be given its independence again--a complete independence. There has always been rivalry between
troops of the line and guardsmen. That's-why it's
a good thing that the SS should constitute, in relation to the others, an absolute distinct world.11
9Josenh Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi
Party (Hinn~apolisz University of Minnesota Press, 1967), p.87.
10Bullock, Op. Cit., p. J6J-4.
11 H.R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler's Secret Conversations,
1941-4 (New Yorks· Farrar, Strauss and Young, 1953) p. 138.

r . . · ..
~~

·.

r_ .••

r,,,~ ~

7.

,.~-~- ·~1~: ·::,:~~-"~~: ·~;mmler' s .~;::~:,.;:~· ..~~:··,·~~

e:;::;ed to

., such a degree that eventually the SS was to.someday, for all
I

~

f practical purposes, be the State. ·. It was to ,form the elite, the
i

I technocrats of the Germanic. Reich• and his order was to be the
!
~I new knights of Europe .12 With the SA removed as a threat to his
.•
··~ order, and with the Party all but leaderless, Hi"mmler be.gan to
i
'l

I
~

~

cast eyes in the direction of the Army and saw an important
field for his expansion.
"Every revolution tries to

Himmler once privately said that,

contr~l

the army and infuse the men

with its own spirit •. Only when that has bee"n achieved is a

~
~

!
!

revolution fiRally triumphant. 0 13

Here"* then, Himmler picked

~ up the dream of the deceased Rohm; the SS was to be the vanguard
of the National Socialist Army.
To this end, Himmler said that Hitler had two choices, he
could scrap the officer corps which he· distrusted anyway, but
the drawback was that their technical expertise would be lost
until a new ideologically orientated corps could be formed and
this clashed with Hitler's expansion policy.

The second choice

was that the SS could be used as " ••• an armed force to embody the
views which National Socialism had to introduce into the Wehrmacht.1114

12Eugen Kogon et. al., Totalitarianism; Tem orar
or Permanent Dan~er? {Bostons D.C. Heath and Co,,
13Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs, ·1940-2 {New Yorks
MacMillan Co., 1957), p. 247-8
(
l

.

14stein, Op. Cit., p. 17.

2.

,...---

8

"::: '":u~h

more feasible and thus the

Verfugungstruppe SS was formed.

This branch of the SS was

·f'"(~" ., ·""'~~; :~~·:;::~i·;~
i

i·,
)

nearly cut off from the rest of the organization and its units
J

were the most heavily armed.

Unlike the Gestapo which was con-

t

cerned with internal police duties, the Verfugungstruppe--later
known as the Waffen-ss--was concerned with fighting enemies beyond .the German frontie.r.

Himmler maintained that these two

units should be separated as strictly as possible so that what
the Gestapo did should not affect.,. the Waffen-SS in any way.15
I would next 'like to discuss the recru!tment policies of
the SS and show how the high standards were maintained within
the SS.

1 5Kersten, Op. Cit., p. 249-50. This view of Himmler's
differs from a statement of his made in 1936. At that time, he
said that the SS was to, " ••• guarantee the security of Germany
from the interior, just as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety
of the honor, the greatness, and the peace of the Reich from the
exterior.·''

.l

I
f

CHAPTER III

f

RECRUITMENT AND STANDARDS

f

Up until the war, the SS was a voluntary organization

f

~ based on long term service; as late as 19J8, resignations were

~

i

I
I,'•

accepted by Himm.le·r if the,·'. individual felt that he could not
live up to what was expected of him.

Indeed, Himmler encouraged
•
ii. such resigna.tions since he. felt that it would improve morale and
!

)

~the ~-need

; negate

f
f

:tor.pu_rges of the SS ranks.

When the SS was first formed, Himmler accepted practically

I anyone who applied since his main interest was in building up an i

l,

impressive enrollment which would
i.

' creased funds.

i

justi~y

his requests for in-

Soon after January, 1933, there were over 50,000

t members and the only purge which would take place expelled many

I members
¥

l

l

0

•••

on grounds of physical or social inadequacy ••• " as

well as on geneological grounds.16
?<Iany of the early joiners were ex-soldiers, middle-class
shopkeepers, ex-academics who during the difficult economic
period had no place and in short felt that the concept of an
"elite" was for them.17

As time went on, and as the Party

l6John Keegan, Waffen-SS; The Asphalt Soldiers (New York:
Ballantine, 1970), p.")1;-6.

17Hohne, Op.

Cit~,

p. 53-4.

10

~~,r:•",!.IJ.-•;

Jgained stren.Q'.th at the polls, many members of the old nobility

.f joined
•

the SS and they were especially welcomed.

This was again

f due to the aura of an "elite" as· opposed to the lower-class SA.
t

f The nob111 ty besipe brin~ing their titles ala'o contrlbuted ----:... ---.

i

!heavily to the organization's coffers.

,

Some of the more notable

f members included the Grund Duke of Me.cklenburgh, Prlnce -~:· Wal~·:·c~
It und Prymont, Prince Christof and Prince Wilhelm of Hesse, Count
'
i,

Bassewitz-Behr und von Pfe11-Burghauss, Re1chfreiherr von Tungen

~

J and
t

Freiherren von Geyr·i von Retzenste1n and von Malsen-Pon1chau,
I

.

f Pr1nz von Hohenzollern-Emden of fhe House of S1gmar1ngen and Count

Ivon der Sohulenburg;. 18
-~~

i

.

f the 1nd'.'ustr1a.11sts

1meine

'.

i

These members ,of the nob111 ty and most· of i

were given high

I

h~norary

ranks in the Allege-

SS which during the war was gradually dissolved by the

~

t recru1 tment

of its members into either the Wehrmacht or the

~ Waffen-SS.

On the other hand, the SD attracted large numbers of

~

I
I

I

I.

!

'~

f lawyers who served 1n the capacity of t-eehnocrats for the gather-

'
f ing and execution of power. 1 9 Al tJ1ough Himmler wanted to create
t
Ja soldier-peasant elite, the peasants were greatly ~nderep~esente~
fin the ss 20 while a full 25% of the SS elite had previous to thei~

I
.

I

J.oining the SS 0 received their doctorate.21

As a rule the SS

I

It

18 rbid

I'

~

19Ib1d., P• 135.

f.

I

____ ., p. 05.

20Karl D.
. Bracher, The German D1ctatorsh1E ( New York: Prae- i
j ger, 1970),. p. 335-6.
f
~

f

~

t

York:

21w1lliam Kornhauser, The Poli tics of Mass Society (New
The· Free Press, 1959), P• 188.
·

.

f

i

'···~~<oiiiilY.,;i~.;;t1~~"'1'""\.C<11~~~..::~~;~,h.,..)';t.,'!.""''l<%O~··mi:r...~.1$~ir,:p~~._"ti.""¥~•'Cll!"~~~""-''K-'~*"~-'~~t1.·.• 11~\J
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.

·.

attracted a lar/Ter number of professional men than any organiza-

1

tion in Hit].er's Germany.22
2 2The charts below show, (1) the proportion of political
• elites from the professions in Germany and (2) the political
elites from the professions in other governments.

(1)

Wein~lr

Cabinet (1918-JJ)

4'0%
32%

SS Elite (1940)
Nazi Cab1r:et (1933-45)

28%

27%

Nazi Elite (19)lt)

Nazi Partj• (1933)

18%

.

u.s.
u.s.

Cabinet (1877-1934)
Con~ress

(1949-51)
French Cabinet (1890-1940)
Conservative MP's (1945)
House of Commons (1945)
IaborMF's (1945)
British Cabinet (1916-35)
Weimar Cabinet (1918-33)
~

[

74%

69%

68%
61%

54%

49%

44%
40%.

(%

of professionals)

"
"

"

(this figure includes
me.rchants and artisans
so the actual proportion of professionals 1
is .substantially less). l
.
I
(% of prof.e.ssionals)
l
H

(% Of occupations
reported)
(% or professionals)
"
"
"

.

Ibid., .p. 184.

j

'. These figures show that while the SS was not exclusively the

i domain of the upper classes, it did not alienate the upper

I class and bourgeois elements as a whole. It seems that Donald
theory is confirmed when he writes;

i Matthews•

A comparison of the backgrounds of Nazi ••• leaders
suggests the tremendous importance of middle-class
intellectuals and professional men in the revolutionary process ••• Unless a substantial number of
them somehow and for some reason become disaffected
revolutionaries, there seems to be relatively little danger of revolution. If, on the other hand,
their loyalties, beliefs, and interests begin to diverge sharply from established political institutions
·.and values, then the revolutionary dynamism may have
been set in motion.
iDonald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political DecisionDoubleday, 19510, p. 58.
'

~ Hakers {Garden City:
'
~

f¥::..·,i .. eic..

,
e
t

"'"~~~~u,,,,~,,....,,,,_~,.,i., ':,('./itJ~l''••J!:';:.~W-r~k·.... ~:i;;,~.<M..~;~.;.~~~~~-~!'!"-'lk.>i'~-;:'.;'!'tt.~.?•WW'"t·•·.'"'~~,;t·~"'"""'~:~ ::,i;~:-.·::i.)"."~-·;-;:,,_•,;~~· •..;~~~·!;;,:.~.!."'.;~~"":.:.·•Vl""J..":~&-1~.''"~~t"'.o~..t..~"!.-,";l;;.:!:.."i .S:;:':",i;\:',W-~·~~lt-~.:o.;:...-·;

12

With the recrui tnent of the nobili t;y and middle-class elements, the elite propaganda line began to take hold on the populace.

It was so successful that· in 1946, Dr. Grober who was the

Catholic Archbishop of Freiburg said, ..... we in Freiburg con-

f,, ;

sidered the SS to be the most re spec table of the Party organiza.i

tions."
wh~n

This n:.ocd was prevalent after the night of June 30, 1934 1

i

the man on the street felt 'relief rather than shock at the

action of the SS,

'

The liberal Frankfurter Zeituntl" wrote, "Liber-!
.·

ation of our people from the rule .of second-raters 1s a prize
worth considerahle sacrifice. 11 23" Thus the bourgeois elements
of society were willing to:accept the methods of totalitarianism
\

i as long as their basic values, security and land were left un~

i

f challenged.
!

~~
~

'

By June 1, 1935, Himmler felt that the SS was strong
enough to withstand a second purge.

Because of the strength of

the SS, Himmler could institute fully his program for racial
purity which he had given up temporarily while his position was
insecure.

The first SS men to come under scrutiny were SS com-

manders from the rank of St.urmbannfuhrer (Major) upwards,

These ;
j

j

men had
cestors.

t~

show tnat neither he nor his wife had any Jewish anBy October 1st of that year, this requirement was ex-

I

l

l
~
I
;

tended to the rank of Oberscharfuhrer (Warrant Officer 2nd Class)]
~

f
i
l

~

and Hauptscharfuhrer (Warrant Officer 1st Class} and eventually
to every SS man.

~

This test was then further expanded to every

i
f

f

23rM.d., p. 132-:33.
.-·i.-,~,,,..,,,
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.

·.-,

r·ofiicer and cadet"'"so that they. h!:id to be' a ble'"fo' .prove racial
•
i
· ·, pur1 ty back to 1750 1·~hile other ra:nks only had to go b~clt to
When Jewish blood was discovered, at least in the low·er

1800.

ranks, the- SS man had to report it to his superiors and request
a release from the

ss.

If a release was not requested, the SS

court would take action e.nd decree

~xpulston.

For the upper

ra.nks, more leniency was shown, often with stipulations.· Often
the SS officer was allowed to stay 1n the SS if he agreed to

I
Ii
~

have no more children a.nd if no existing sons would request
24
entrance into the ss.
Under the directorship of Himmler, Professor

~t:finoK.

Schultz submitted a set of ·criteria which outlined SS require-

I.! ments.

These.were based primarily on racial overtones and were

I

t in accord with Himmler's belief tnat within 120 years, the en~
~

I
~

tire German people should be purely Nordic 1n appearance.

f,

though the recruit was to be a blue eyed, blond ideal, there

•

.,

g

J
~

Al-

was no criteria for the level of 1ntelligence.~5

The require-

tioned" individuals were the mainstay of the SS,

This obses-

iI ments which Schultz set up were to insure that "well-proporI'

i

1·

i

r

24~., p. 14).
i
2 5schultz set down five racial groupings which existed
~ the world, they were, "pure Nordic," "predominantly Nordic or
I Phalio," harmonious bastard with, "slight Alpine, Dinario or
Mediterranean characteristics," bastard of predominantly East! Bal tic or Alpine origin and bastards of extra-European or1 gin.
J Of these five groups, only the first three were acceptable to
~ the ss.
There were also nine other headings which were concerned with physical requirements.
~

I
.!

l
I
t

1n

14
•

~

,~

'"'i!'-. .~..t

! sion

:"

; .<

'~~ ;

"'

•

'

,,.~

"·'"'"::._""J:',. '''

' ""''- •;,, .. ~ '··\ C, ".

«~.~~-:i:~ ...,;,~~-.,

. "

"··.,, ''~"·"t'li.''11-~--"'l.1N*•;..".,

~';-;·1.,'.,;.f"t,;1,<;,r~ .• ~y,,~., · .~::-;'<, ,,>,~·.;;::-::;b·.,..,.., "I-~;,.-"""'-;;...:;:.---;•· •

with "well-proportioned" individuals was explained by

i;

1 Himmler, who said;
~

The point is that in his attitude to discipline
the r.ian should not behave like an underling,
that his gait, his hands, everything, should
correspond to the ideal which we set ourselves.• 26
After the candidate had met the racial sta:ndard.s, he had

i

to undergo further tests before he could swear the "kith and kin" \i'
oath and be called an SS man. When the candidate was 18, on

j

November 9th, the anni ve.rsarY of the Munich Be.er Hall Putsch, he l

~

l
i

to wear the SS uniform without the collar patches •
l Bywas theallowed
following January 30, which marked the Nazi seizure of·

.J

I
t

'

power, the applicant who was now a cadet, was given a provisional:'

'

~

SS pass.

By.Hitler's birthday--April 20--he received his perma-

nent SS pass, the collar patches artd recited the oath,27
The final stage was not yet reached however, for he still

I had to obtain the
{
~'

i

by October 1st.

Reich Sport Badge and learn the SS catechism
The SS man then had to serve time in"the Labour

i! Service and the Wehrmacht and was then returned to the
t~
If
I
J
.i'

"Vollanwarter" or full candidate.

SS as a

If his.reports were good, he

could be accepted into the order within a month.

Finally, by

November 9th, he had to swear one more oath which dealt with
the marriage laws of the Reichfuhrer-SS and was finally given

~

i

I

·i

I

~I

t

> ; ·' •'./ r

i

26Hohne, Qp. Cit., p. 143
27 Ibid., 146-?.
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his SS dagger.28

28This catechism was designed to drill Himmler's· concept
of ·chivalry and spirit into the SS man; some of the questions
and answers were as follows:
Qs

As

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Why do we believe in Germany and the Fuhrer?
Because we believe in God, we believe in Germany
which he created in His world and in the Fuhrer,
Adolf Hitler, whom He has sent us.
Whom must we primarily serve?
Our people and our Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler.
Why do we obey?
From inner conviction, from belief in Germany,
in the Fuhrer, in the Movement, and in the SS,
and from loyalty.
·

. '

CHAPTER IV

!

BRANCHES

I

I

The entire SS organ1zat;1on rema1n.ed until quite recently

l

' a
1

gigantic enigma.

Parti~lly

due to the findings of the Nurem-

I~ berg War Trials, objective studies and opinions of the organ1za- I-·-

''
II
~
I
~

i.
I•
J

I

tion were quite difficult to come by.

.

Recently however, several

excellent studies ot the SS and the Nationa~ Socialist regime

have been

publ1~hed.

/.

l
j

The size a.nd scope of the SS organization can best be
judged from the organizational .chart (See Appendix #1).

t

As can

be seen, the police duties of the Gestapo and SD were separated

i,.·

i. ·

!

( from the duties of the Waffen-SS and .th.e Totenkopfverbande. Also,'

i
I
I
!

the var1ous ad.m1n1strat1ve and procedural off1ces, .such as those

of the Racial and Settlement, a.Rd the Economic departments were

: strictly separated from the secur1 ty branches.

The first branch i

l

i

~-I

would like to discuss 1s the Gestapo.

.

Gestapo

While it is one of the most famous--or 1nfamous--branohes
of the SS, the Gestapo was the only one which was not er1g1nall7 .
an SS organization.

It was originally established 1n 1933 by

Hermann Goering 1n Prus::;1a, " ••• w1th the mission of carrying out
the duties of political police with or 1n place of the ordinary
(

L.·-···---·-·-----·· .-~----·-··--··-·-"---~~----··

·m··· ..-·
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police authorit1es." 29

When 1t ~as brou~ht under Himml~r•s con- '

trol during the spring of 1934 it began to function as an extension of the State, as opposed to the SD which acted as an extension of the Party.

By June 26, 1936, Himmler who was now the Chief of the
German Police under Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior,
issued a decree which created two chiefs of police; the uniformed and the Security Police.

t

Thus the German police system

f

~ was divided into two branches, with two separate and distinct

J sets,

i

!
!

or

duties.

The first bran;h was that Of the ORPO--Regular

;•.

Schutzpol1ze1 (Safety Police), the Gendarmerle (Rural Police)

r and

I

the Geme1ndepolize1 (Local Police).30

'

~

SIPO was divided between the Reich Krim1nalpo11ze1 (KRIPO) and

f,

the Gehe1me Staatspolizei (GESTAPO) and both were under the com-

~

j

I

mand of Heydrich, the famed 'Blond Beast• who was assassinated
/

in Prague when his pac1f lcat1ons procedures were nullifying the
fears of its c1t1zens.31

~
~

I

!

Ij

I
I

I.

The

t~

Ii

'\'

f

The second branch was the S1oherkertspol1ze1 or SIPO.

I

~

l.

Police and Ordnu,ngspol1ze1, which in-turn was composed of the

~

£

i

Finally, by late October 0f 1939, Himmler combined the
central offices of the Gestapo, SD and Criminal Police into the
29Naz1 Coq~£iracy and Aggression, Op. Cit., P• 249-52.
JOibid., p. 252.
3 1 ~ •• p. 252.
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t:
~
~'

Re1chssicherhe1tshauptamt (Reich Security Main Offioe--RSHA).

The Gestapo was known on the org[1n1zat1on charts of the

RSHA as

A~t

IV.

By 1943 it contained five sub-sections (See

f Appendix ~2) wAioh dealt with nearly every aspect of German 11fe. 1

{

Section A was set up to deal with internal opponents, sabo-

f

f tage as well as protective services.
I~ into four dep~rtments as follows:

It was further subdivided

~

i

f

Al: .Communism, Marxism and associated organizations, war
orimes, illegal and enemy propaganda

I.

I

I

I

Al:

'

sabotage, combattj.ng of sabotage,

AJ:

Reaction, opposition, leg1t1m1sm, liberalism, matters
of malicious opposl ti on

A4:

Protective service, reports of attempted assassinat1on, guarding, special Job.st pursu1 t troops

Section B was relisously orientated and was subdivided as
follows:
Bl;

Pol1t1calCatholic1sm

B2:

Political Protestantism Sects

BJ:

Other churches, Freemasonry

B4:

Jewish affairs, .matters of evacuation, means of sup-

pressing enemies of the people and State, dispossesston of rights of German citizenship.

l

:i ·

!

political falsification

~

II

Det'~~nse aga1~nst

l'

..

(Eichmann was

head of this office).
Section C was concerned with the ext'Cnsive card files, pro...

19

''

·i

Cl:

Evaluation, main card index, administration of individual files, information office, and supervision of

i·

foreign engineers.

i

C2:

Matters of protective custody

CJ:

Matters of the press and literature

C4:

Hatters of the Party and its formations, special
cases

Section D dealt with regions under German influence;
'

.

..

D (aus. arb.) Foreign workers
Dl:

Matters of the

Protectorat~,

•
Czechs in the Reich,

Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions
of the former Jugoslavia and Greece

.

D2:

Hatters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich

DJ:

Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State,
and emigrants

,.h

~~

.

_/

D4:

Occupied territories, France, Belgil.lmr Holland, Norway and Denmark

D5:

Occupied Eastern Territories

Section E q.ealt with security and was subdivided as follows;
El:

General security matters, supply of legal opinions in
matters of high and State treason, and other security'
. matters

E2 :.

General economic matters, defense against economic
espionage, protection of works and those engaged in

f

'.,

20

guarding

EJ:

Security West

E4:

Security .North

E51 . Security East
~,...

Security South

l!.0 :

Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and •
was subdivided as follows;
Fl:

Frontier police

F2:

Passport matters

F3:

"
Identification and identity
cards
!

~

I

Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers ;

I

'~

~

Central visa office32

F5:

I
t.
~

As can _be seen, the Gestapo was able to burrow into vir-

f tually every facet of German life.

While the members of the

~

. Gestapo did not receive the strict National Socialist ideological
t.
~ training of the SS Verfugungstruppe, its members were never the
less Nazis.

The Ge stapp worke.d hand in hand with the dreaded

SD division of the SS.
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) ·

.

I
f

The SD is on the Whole, one of the best known divisions of
Although it is generally thought of as an external or-

~

the SS.

i~
i

ganization--i.e., for use outside of Germany, it was also used

,
1

___
within Germany.

I
J

!"

!
~

l

t,."''· " ." •¥""'" .w•

Its "best known" activity was the razing of the

32 Ibid., p. 253-4
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Warsaw Ghetto.

The SD was Section (Amt) III of the RSHA and by

1943, it contained four sections.
Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure

1

'

J of the Reich;
Al:

General questions of work on spheres of German life

A2:

Law

AJ:

Constitution and administration

A4:

National life in general

A5:

General questions of police law, and technical ques-

..

tions of legislation
Section B dealt with nationality and was subdivided as

·~

i

I'
!

follows;

~

B1:

Nationality questions

B2:

Minorities

BJ:

Race and health of the people

B4:

Citizenship and naturalization

B5:

Occupied

terr~tories

Section C dealt with' culture and was subdiylded as follows::
~

·

Cl:

Science

C21

Edµcational religious life

CJ:

Folk culture and art

C4:

Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of
material

Section D .dealt with economics, and was subdivided as
follows;
Das

Reading office, economics, press, magazines, litera-

22
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t

ture

.~

Db:

Colonial economics

Ds:

Special questions and review of material

t

D West:

I

D Osta

$
f

Western occupied regions
Eastern occupied regions

Dls

Food economy

D2:

Coin!Ilerce, handcrar-t and transport

DJ:

Fiiiance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance

1!
l
~
I

D4:

Industry and power

D5:

Labor and social quest1ons3?.

l

The first head of the SD was Reinhardt Heydr1ch, the

1

.

'Blond Beast': under him it became extremely powerful and. by
l

9J4, it was the sole intelligence· and . counter-.inteliigence

·t agency of the NSDAP.
t

'

~
~

Due to the need for security, it was sepa-

rated from the rest of the SS until 1939, when the RSHA was

·~

' formed.34

The success of the SD was partially due to the large

~

'

J number of lawyers who were recru1te9.: these men were not ideal-

j

istic, but were rather strict technicians for power.JS
The impact of these ·"intellectuals" on the SD was 'important;

I for the SD.often carried on separate policies in the various
I

I

JJ1b1d •• p.

254-5.

J 4Ibid., p. 179-80.
35Hohne, Op. Cit., p. 135.
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, territories which it controlled •. For example, when Reinhardt
Heydrich was transferred to head the government of the area formerly know-n as Czechoslovakia., he instituted reforms which were
aimed at neutralizing any potential resistance.

He improved the

working conditions in the factories, improved the fringe

benefits~

~ of the workers and in general, made the lot of the Czech worker

almost equal to that of the German workers.

Unlike his prede-

cessor, he drove through Prague in an open car, without bodyguards to show the people that he,. did not fear them. These poll ...
cies did net make the Czeths love<the Germans, but resis·tance . · ·
.

-·."")-

was practically nullifi'ed until af.ter Heydri9h Is assassination.
when the Germans reverted to their old iron fist tactics.

the case in Czechoslovakia, only resistance, open or underground,
was treated with sudd~n swiftness.36
As a whole, two policies concerning police duties in occupied territories were ih effect.

The first policy, which dealt

with an occupied country which had a puppet ruler, utilized the

,. local police to a greater extent •

This was to maintain the inde-

i

~

f pendent facade which the Germans wished to preserve.

For exam-

ple, in the Netherlands, the local police were used unless the
Reich Commissioner .called on the German SS or police forces for

p.

79.

36Roger ~~anvell, Gestapo Ofow York:

Ballantine, 1969),
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J minor duties, such as traffic patrols, protection of buildings,
l etc., and 1f a German was involved 1n any case, the Polish police

f

i could

not act.37

~

'!

~side

f

Th\lS 1t was that

betwe~n

the Gestapo and SD,

eve~yone

and outside of Germany came under surveillance.

in-

When 1n

~December of 1941, the Nacht und Nebel--the Night and Fog act--

~was

ins'Ci tuted, the powers of

th~

Gestapo increased dramatical.J..y,

f

'for;
r

,<

~

!

,

J
~;

II

••• anyone could be seized whom the authorities chose
to believe endangered German security whatever his
nationality and spirited out of the country 'in night
and f'og' so that no form of local trial or ~3ar1ng
should take place to stir up local feeling.

The Nacht und Nebel decree only was the end point of the

f

~
ipower
of the SS 1n the occupied lands.

Earll.er, in March of

f 1941, the Reich Comm.1ss1oner of the Netherlands issued a decree

Iwhich stated

i
,I
I

in part that;

In fulf.11lment of his duties the Supreme SS and
·police chief may deviate from existing regulations •••
He may promulgate rules and regulations having the
force and effect of laws. such rules and regula-.
tions may contain penal provisions subjecting a de-

i

.f------------~
i
f

37Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occup1.ed EufijPe. (Washington:
Endownent for International Peace,. 194 , p. 22.
.

t Carnegie

If:
§

£

~

i'

38Manvell, OB. Cit., p. 79.
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The SD n:eam·:hile, invest:!.c·a.ted the

11

'

loyal ty and reliability",

{

of State cfflclals 5.n the fields of adherence ~o
- -·i'_razi ideol ogy

l; and. devotion
.

to Hitler.

To help them 1 n .this task, the SD had

!
~

sever9.l hundred ful1-tii!le ar:d several thousand pa::r;t-time infer-

~
I

mants who seemingly lived average lives in shops, schools,

r~churches,

I
'

etc.40

Both the Gel:itapo and

f

~

$D

were constantly attempting to ex-

'

1 pand the realm of their acti vi tie-s.
t

''j to take credit for the purge of the

The SD for a while attempted!
Red

I

Army by Stalin while the

•
'

;'

! Gestapo

seemed to concentrate on the Abl·:ehr. · The Abwehr was the

~

\ i?ltelligence service of the Wehrmacht and the first success of

!

i the

·~

Gestapo came in the autumn of 1942 when an Abwehr agent was
.

; picked up at the old Czech border.
with violation of the

~urrency

He was originally charged

regulations, but it was learned

from him that certain Abwehr officers were involved in getting
Jews out of the country by giving them papers of Abwehr agents.
Later interrogations of Ahwehr agents showed that certain
officers were involved in secret negotiations with the Vatican
to end the war.
Finally, on April 5, 1943, the big break came when a State
Attorney in the Abwehr office of Admiral Canaris--the Commander-

39'
Ibid., P• 79.
40Nazi Conspiracy ~d A~gression, Op. Cit., p. 25

,

i

i

I

l
I'
l

l'
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, in-Chief of the

Abwehr~-was

arrested and a group of files was

seized which gave codes, names and dates for future contacts with
the Allies.

Then, in January of the next year, a resistance ring .

was broken by the Gestapo which included several Abwehr officers. i
At this final finding, Hitler authorized a crack-down and blamed
Canaris for these leaks in his department.

As a joke, Hitler's

future brother-in-law suggested that the SS take over the offices
·' of the Abwehr and Hitler quickly agreed.

From that time on, the

Wehrmacht was the only Army not to have its own secret service
organization.·41
ThUs it was that by 191}4, not only the civilian populace
was under surveillance by the SS, but the Wehrmacht was dependent·.

upon the SS for all intelligence inf.ormation.

But the power of

the SS extended into other areas as will be seen in the following
sections.
SS Polizei Regimente

The SS Polizei Regi.mente played on the whole, a minor part
in the role of the

ss.·

Its members were not volunteers, but

·were rather drafted by Himmler from the ranks of· German constables when Himmler received permission from Hitler to increase the.
number of SS divisions from one to three.

This permission was

grant.ad shortly after the close of the Polish campaign. 42

41Ibid., p·. 48)-6.

u2
· Keegan, On. Cit., p. 61.
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Originally the members of this organization, which was
incorporated into the Waffen-SS under the divisional title of
4th SS Polizei-Fanzergrenadierdivision, were older in age than
the other members of the Waff en-SS and they did not share the
high amount of mechanized equipment of the other Waffen-SS
~ divisions.43

. Throughout the war, this SS division was used mostly in
police actions with the "savage peoples" as auxiliaries and in
anti-partisan duties.44
AllP-'.emeine·SS
The Allgemeine SS--General SS--was c·onsidered at the post-

war Nuremburg trials to be the backbone of the SS.

This section

of the SS could be roughly considered the equal of the 1933 SA
in that its member.Ship was large, reaching a peak of 240,000, and'
its duties uncertain.

It was often used during the anti-Jewish

pogroms of 1938 and in vari.ous colonization efforts.45
Its membership was.largely middle-class and many members
, Of the old nobility Were in this division Where they Were given
'·high honorary ranks in return for monetary contributions.
Its members were subject to draft into the Wehrmacht and
during the war its total membership fell to approximately
43 Ibid., p. 62

4L~Nazi Conspiracy and A~gression, Op. Cit., p. 186.

45Ibid., p. 178-9.
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were able.to get into the Waffen-SS divisions, but the majority were drafted into the Wehrmacht.

Al-

though their general level of political indoctrination was not

f high,

they did have an effect on the ordinary Wehrma.cht

soldier~?~

Totenkopfverbande
Shortly after Himmler became the police chief in Munich,
he forr::ed the Totenkopf (Death's Head) guards,48 which was recruited from volunteers from the Allgemeine

ss.49

Although elevated to the status of a. Waffen-SS division in
"

1940,50 they were originally set up to provide:
••• indoctrination of- the· armed political soldier,
••• (and) guarding enemies of the State who are
held in concentration camps.51
As guards of the concentration camps, the Death's Head guards
, were responsible for both Jews and non-Jews who were opponents
f(

t~

,.
1·

or supposed opponents of the regime.

LL6
. Ibid., p. 178-9.
.
47 An interesting book which deals with the General SS memf ·bers who served in the Wehrmacht, is Diary of a German Soldier,
~ by Wilhelm Pruller.
The high level of belief in the National
i Socialist ideal and Hitler can be seen in Pruller•s work.

i

t

~

'

}'·

.r

48 Keegan, Op. Cit., p. 37.
49Nazi Conspiracy and Ag~ression, Op. Cit., p. 185.

l

I
1
1

50The division was known as Jrd SS Panzerdivision Totenkopf and was considered one of the "classic" Waffen-SS divisions.!

51

Nazi Conspiracy and

A~gression,

Op. Cit., P• 185.
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Like the Allgemeine SS,

enllstme~t

did not co~nt as military service.52

in the Totenkopfverbande•

This was changed after the

Polish campaign when the divisional strength of the armed SS was
raised from one to three.

.

With the decree counting service in

the Totenkopfverbande as military service, duty in this branch
lost much of its bad color.
VerfUP::Un<Tstrup:Qe SS and Ha.ffen-SS
These branches of the SS have, since the war, been the
branches under closest examination,
.. due to their varied duties,
actions and record.,

The Verfugungstruppe (Reserve Force) was

set up by Him.filer and Hitler in·· Narch of 1935.

Its original

purpose 1-vas obscure but its formation was important for it:

••• marxs the institution of a formal distinction
between the militarised SS aftd the rest of the
organization.5.3
Set up on the strength of a division--i.e., three regiments,
stationed in Munich, Hamburg, and Berlin--they were commanded
by one of the few former·high ranking Army officers av~ilable
to the SS, Paul Hausser.
This division of the SS received the greatest degree of
political indoctrination and its officer training was perhaps
the most difficult ever established.

5 2Keer:-an, OD. Cit., p. 56. At the peak of the pre-war
period, a total .strength of twelve battalions was reached.

53 Ibid., p. 53.

r
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Reveille at six was followed by an hour's physical
traininc;, breakfast of porr1dp:e and m1.neral water
••• and a nornin~ of weapon tri:i1n1ng and exercises.
Three times a week the cadets received 'ideolop.:ical
instruction,' at first from specially appointed instructors, later, when they seemed to be developing
what Himmler called •commissar status,• from the
c¢~pany.officers.
The texts mo~t frequently used
were Rosenberg's Myth of the Twentieth Centurz and
Darre' s 2120.~~.1. ~?ill• The :ifternoons were spent
on the square or the~nports field, athletic prowess
being highly valued.~

~ posi t1on opened
s
!
[a.ls. The prioe concern of the generals was to maintain the tra-

.~

ld1t1onal right of the Army to be the sole

be~rer

! State. By a secret order ·on AuP.:Ust 17, 1938,
·': that pr1 vilege. The order in part said;

of arms 1n the

Hitler cancelled

i

I:t.
A.

1.

The Armed Units of the SS.
(The SS Vertugung,struppe)
The SS Verfugurigstruppe is neither part of the
Wehrmacht nor part of the police. It is a
standing armed unit exclusively at my disposal.
As· such and as a unit of the NSDAP, its members
are to be selected by the Retchfuhrer SS according to the philosophical and political standards which I have ordered for the NSDAP and
for the Schutlzstaffel (SS). Its members are to
be trained and its ranks filled with volunteers
from those who are subject to serve 1n the army
who have finished their duties 1n the obligatory
labor service. The service period for volunteers

541,lli.' p. 53.
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is four years. It may be prolonged for SS Unterfuhrer. Such re~ulations a~e in force for SS
leaders. The corxo:.llsorv r-:tlitnry service ••• is

-time

fulfill~d bv se:rv17-i-Ofth"~;e amount of
in the s.3-ver.f'u:""ur:~r:=:-c:rm::n:ie.
( 1 tali cs added). )5

fThus, with one swift move, Hitler moved against the wishes of the
jaeneral Staff and opened the power flood-gate for Himmler.
~

~

1

At the time of the Polish invasion, the SS Verfugungstruppe;

'iwas little more than divisional size and its role was quite limi1

;ted.

Its performance was not outstanding but Hitler gave Himmler

'

)permission to increase its strength to three div:isions.56
l
"
The armed SS, ndf,f called Waffen-SS,
plllyed·roles in the

ti
l

; French and Balkan campaigns, but its

;

~

~made

in the Russian campaign.

r~putation

and legend was.·

After the recapture of Kharkov in

·~

; late .1942 during which General Paul Hausser' s" .. ss Panzer Corps
~

··!'suffered 12,000 casualties,57 but stopped the Soviet offensive,
·the legend of the SS in Hitler's mind e_xpanded and from this time
on, the SS steadily increased its priority for men and material.
;This preference for munitions led to certain clashes with the

~

~Army58 but until after the war, the army generally was gla~ for

55Nazi Consniracy and Aggression, Op. Cit., p. 185.
56
.
Keegan, Op. Cit., p. 62.
57rbid., p. 84.
·~

fo
~
l
1·

58 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New Yorks
), p. 242-J.
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f the "Fire Brigade"59 of the SS, as well as for some of the other
units.
During the war, the Waffen-SS expanded to an organization
Most of

1which could show the ·divisional badges of )8 units.

f these units never got larger than regimental strength
tdisbanded or dissolved before the end of the war.

and many

The hard-core

'.SS divisions ·which were made up of Germans were slightly larger

· ·~than
the Wehrmacht di visions and recel ved more tanks and assault
~
",.

~guns

i

!

than the average panzer division.
"
Prior to 1943, Himmler allowed the mass drafting Of con- ·

f scripts into the ranks of the Waf-fen-ss.
\

This was coupled wt th

Jthe decree allowing the Waffen-SS to accept non-Germans into the
~Waffen•SS.

At first, only French, Dutch or other races Which were~

·[close to the Germans were allowed.

Also, racial Germans from the

f

·occupied countries were allowed into the Waffen-SS and this again
!produced a clash with the Wehrmacht, for the Wehrmacht had no way
'·

;or conscripting these racial Germans.
~

~German/West

The most famous of the

European divisions was 5th SS Panzerdivision Wiking.

Finally, in late 194-J, Slavs and other "inferior" peoples
r'

;were accepted into the Waffen-SS.

This was a mixed blessing, for

59The .. Fire Brigade" was the name of the SS divisions--lst
'SS Panzerdivision Leibs±andarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzerdivision Das Reich, and Jrd SS Panzer division Totenkopf--which was
,used as a mobile reserve by Hitler. These units were constantly
·shuffled from the Eastern Front, to the Western Front and to the
'Italian Front as needed. Due to their equipment, personnel and
•·indoctrination, they constantly fought successful defensive bat• tles.
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' such units as the lJth Waffen-Geb1rgsd1vision der SS Handschar
i
~ (Kroatische Nr 1) which was ma.de up of Yugoslav Muslims, merely
'.:

1 took up valuable funds and munitions, while at the same time,
'

f they

were-difficult to control.

i few,

such as the divisions recruited from the Baltic Republics,

Others, and here the number is

I' Lithuania 1 Latvia and Estonia, provided go·od :M.ghte.rs who remained
~
60·
i to the end•

!
1

The officers for these non-Nordic divistons underwent,
when time allowed, the same training as the r-e.gular Waffen-SS

t of·t'J.cer·s. Onl:v one

'.\

part of the·program was deleted however, and

I

!

~

that was,the rac1a.l indoctrination.

f

d1y1sions then, was their traditional hatred for the Russians,

The mot1va.t1on for these

·i or their belief that they were fighting for

Ij

th~ir

homeland.

From the records of the war, the battle$ of the Waffen-SS

I can

be viewed, but what was said at the time is also important.

! .

;· From this point on, when I refer to the Waffen-SS, I am referring·

!
f

; only to the "classical 0 divisions which were predominately German.,

i

( There are many gauge'S to test the Waffen-SS by; should we use
'·

~:

:(· easual1 ties as a yard stick?
.

~

t
~

If we do, then the SS was a success, for General Sepp

f,

j Dietrich said at the time of the last battles in Hungary, that

\

out of his original d:lvision--which numbered nearly 20,000--only
16 of the original men were still alive.

Or, we could use the

fact that after the battle of the Falaise gap, the Hitler Jugend ·

60Keegan, Op. Cit., p. 103
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~

Fu.vision only had 600 men 1-eft--this after they stopped the BritI

.

iish-Canadian offensive under Montgomery•
Another aspect of the Waffen-SS which should be examined,

11s the geueral attitude.of the men.

In other words, if we say

ithat the high casualities were not caused by poor leadership,
'
-.then
what were they caused by?

The answer would seem to lie in
'
ltheir training, for if the theories of their 1ndoctrinat1on were
;'

~absorbed,

then their high casual1t1es would be explained.

The

f.

'iofficers cadet program stressed leadership; the motto of the offi-

.
1

~cers

-

"

.

was, "Follow Me" and it summed up the aggressive style of

;.

Ithe
t

corps.

A Wehrmacht General said that the Waffen-SS were not •·

' soldiers, but rather fighters. 61
I

·~troops
•

''

~was

~when

1

ot the regular Wehrmacht

By this, he me.ant that the

we~e solP.1ers, and soldiering

and 1s a profession like any other.
and. where it

~s

called for.

It is a trade to be used

The Waffen-SS trooper however,

saw life as a belligerent act.
This outlook was for:mally called "heroic realism" and it

( was part of a concept which had begun in Germany near the end of
,.

tthe first World War.
~

l

lWaffe~-SS

This outlook was incorporated into the

because these troops were to prove themselves and the

r:

'theories of National Socialism.

'f

While all soldiers are expected

i----------------------~-----

~

61Hans Buckheim, Anatomy of the SS State, (Ed. by Martin

· l Broszat, et. al.) "The SS--!nstrument of Domination," (New York:

; Walker and Co., l.965), p. 322.

I
~

!

~
~

f

~
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. '

~to.be hare. in that they can inflict and bear pain, the SS concept
~
,.J

went be;rond this, for the SS man was expected to show a willing-

ness to shed blood, be it either hi.sown, or the enemies•.62

As Himmler said;
For the SS man there is one absolute principle; he
must be honest, decent, loyal and friendly to pe.rsons of our own blood--and to no one else.63

i

lThis idea which was expounded continually at the officer cadet
lschools at Bad Tolz in Bavaria and in Brunswick, was to help save

~

)Gerrr.a.n blood and Kultur.
'

~

To this end, the lives of those not of

~
lGerman
biood was expendable.

-

German laws were sacred when deal-

t

'ting with "Asiatics" since they _were sub-human.

The entire con-

Qcept of the weak being spared at the cost of _the strong not only
~

tran contrary to history, but also to SS thinking.

.

t

i•Eeroic realism" was, as I said, begun near the end of

'

~

r

: World War I, when some German :nationalist saw that the war was
; lost, and that a new ideal was needed. 64
t

'the Free Corps in

!

Germany~

It was ..the basis for

and Dr,· We.rner Best said in 1930,

!' that;
~

~

':

~

.

The fight itself is essential and permanent; the
aims of that fight are temporary and changeable.
Th.ere can therefore be no question of success in
our fight ••• the yardstick of the new code of

62

Ibid., P• )4.

63Ib1d., p. 334-6.

64Ibid., p. 323-4.
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morality, therefore, 1s not its content--not •what'
but 'how.•65
·
This concept made morality relative and cleared the way for
,any act1on.

'I

The end Justiflc,!d the means and the oor:lmon soldier

'was relieved of all. responsibility.

~effect

!

To those who play down the

of indoctrination, they should look at the concept of the

j sub-human and how it was absorbed by the Waffen-ss.

i

Because of the elite characteristic nature of the SS, the

'

iideology
of the sub-human, at least before the war, was quite
,
;

f strong.

For example, a brochure'entitled The Sub-Human stated to 1
;
•
jthe SS that the Slavs were not hwnan.

I
i
~

i
~

~

!
~

To the outward eye• the sub-human is biologically an
entirely similar creature of nature; he has hands,
feet and a sort of brain with eyes and a mouth. In
fact, however, he is a totally different and frightful creature, a caricature of a man with features
similar to those of a h~":la.n but intellectually and
morally lower than any animal. Th1.s creature 1s activated by a ghastly chaos of savage, unrestrained
passions--limitless destrgct1veness, primitive lust,
and shameless vulgarity.66
The effectiveness of this indoctrination is difficult to

If judge,

'
I
i

.,
p

but such a man as General Felix Steiner, a Waffen-SS

~1v1s1onal leader, threw the idea out the.window after having

fought the Soviets.67

There are many interesting stories however,

! in the book, Anatomy of the SS State which deal with the exper165Hohne, Op. Cit., p. 159
66ste1n, Opt Cit., P• xxvi

67Hohne,. op. Cit., p. 58-9~'

37

~

'i
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ences and views of the SS men.

These men who had to fight the

Russians everyday often had rejected the pre-war propaganda, but

!

i

'

' in battle and prisoner-of-war camps.

:>-

changed their views after seeing and dealing with the Russians
This is not to verify the

'

l indoctrination

which the SS men received, but rather can be at-

'

f tributed to the difference in the cultures and the standard of
living.
Separated from home for long periods of time, and aware of
their preferential treatment, there is little reason for shock
at the attitude of the men in the Waffen-SS •• The' warwith Russia
was to the Waffen-SS men a holycrusade,68 and this crusade gave
cause to its fight.

Perhaps .the record and attitude of the

~ Waffen-SS is best sum?ted up from a telegram that was captured
~

from the Soviet High Command; it said:
The German Wehrmacht is streaming back on all
fronts. Only th~ Waffen-SS is standing like a
rock in the sea.69

68 stein, Op. Cit., p. 122.
69Kersten, Op. Cit .• , p. 241.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF GERMANIC MYTHOLOGY IN THE SS
Himmler as Reichfuhrer SS, had a tremendous effect on the
entire SS organization.

Prior to the war, he personally took

charge of officers• promotions, training manuals, etc.
aside from a strict organization inan, a mystic.

He was,

''.(

Himmler sought

•

to create a closed order, a new elite and he played heavily upon
German myths to support his order.
Himmler envied the organizational skill of the Jesuits, and '
I

he set up the SS on the same organizational level.

Like the

Jesuits, the SS men were held to strict obedience and were held
responsible to no temporal power save Himmler and Hitler.70

To

maintain an aura around the SS, special rings, insignias and
daggers were all distributed according to length of service,
Party membership, etc.

To reintroduce the idea of medieval chi-

v:alry, Himmler allowed dueling to be used as a means of settling
points of honor.

·l.
(

.

i

'·'

70Hohne, On. Git., p. 144-5. The SS were legally responsible for its own members, neither the State, Party nor Wehrmacht
could try an SS man for an offense. As Brigadefuhrer Paul Schar-:
fe, who was responsible for the legal arm of the SS said, "Compared to the ordinary member of the Party, the SS man naturally ,
occupies a special place, primarily because it's his duty to pro-;
tect the Movement and its Fuhrer, if necessary at the sacrifice !
of his life, This special position, •• of course means that the
'
SS man must be dealt with in a special way."

39

Constantly referring back to the Germanic heritage, Himmler,
believed he could commur.lcate with a long dead German Emperor.
Ee also believed in the lecend that the last German fortress to
fall before a barbarian invasion from the East would be in Westphalia.

To this end, he spent lJ,000,000 marks on the restora-

tion of a castle in Westphalia called Wervelsburg.

It had a

library of 12;QOO boots and a huge oaken table situated in a
dining hall whfch measured 100 feet by 145 feet.
J bedrooms was

fu~nished

Each Of its

in a diff:rent period and the guests were f

i expected·to read the books available iri the bedrooms so that

~i

l

1

i

thE'fY might feel the "spirit" whiclr Himm1 er be 1 ieved ex 1 s t e d

1

I

there.

Aside from all this, there was a stone crypt with walls

~

i

It was the realm·of the dead, and it contained: 1
!
a flight of stairs in the middle of the crypt (which)
led into a. well-lilre cavity; in the center of the
cavity there was a stone stoop, and around the walls
were twelve stone pedestals. In the event of an
.i
Obergruppenfuhre.r' s death, his arms were to be burnt
in the stoop and an urn containing ashes placed on
one of the pedestals. The fo~r vents in the ceiling
were so arranged that, during the burning ceremony,
the smoke would ascend to the roof in a single column.71

fiYe feet thick.

~

~

Within the SS

0

order," rape and plunder were punishable by

death and while a soldier might requisition what he needed at the.
time while in the field, such as food and blankets, it was forbidden to take anything for the use of the dependents at home.

~

As Himmler said, "Plunder is certainly not a gentlemanly crime

~.

''

in our eyes."72

71Hohne, Op. Ci~~· p. 149-53.
72

Kersten, On. Cit., n.
240-1.
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CHAPTER VI

i
I

FRICTION BETWEEN THE SS AND THE WEHRMACHT

t
••l

Frior to the seizure of powe:r, Hitler realized the impor-

I

J

tance of the Army, both as a source of political power and as a
high school for the people.73

In.Nein Kamof, Hitler w:r.ote,

What the German people owes" to the Army can be
briefly sum;'1~d up in a single word, to wit 1
everything. ?<+
Accord:..ng to Hitler, the army taught the masses obedience, responsibility; patriotism and duty.

Thus it was that the army

held a special place in the State.

There was a hitch in Hitler's .

loyalty however, and it was in his distrust of the officer corps.:
As a rule, it reflected a conservative attitude toward politics
and it had been constantly hesitant about the policy of rearmament, 75 a.~d had been against his war plans.
Himmler was of the opinion that every revolution attempted
to control the army, and that as long as the army maintained its

73Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party,
1933-39 (London: Cassell, 196b), p."b2.
74

Adolf. Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston:

" 1943)' p. 280-1..

75 o•Neill, OE• Cit., p. 101.
,.:

Hurst and Blackett,
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·'

independence, a truely National Socialistic state could not
evolve.

Himmler realized that the officer corps could not be

scrapped, so the Verfugunp.-struppe SS and later the Waffen-SS
were seen as " ••• the protagonist of the National Socialist revo- f
1

lution in the. military field."

The Waffen-SS was to keep the

good traits. of the army, such as the tradition and efficiency,
but 1 t was to add its oi'm "personalized" touches.

In the Waffen-;

SS, the individual soldier would not become an automaton, but
would rather know what he was fighting for and against.
officers and men of''· the Waffen-SS were to be the
for a·new model army."76

0

•••

The

cadres •••

It was Himmler's belief that whenever

the SS fought, victory would show through.

The result of these

victories would make the German people ask why the SS fought and
won, and the .ans.wer would be;
Because these are dedicated men who know what they
are fighting: for, who show by their example that
the conviction in the justice of their cause .doubles their fi~hting strength, giving them a force
that nothing can re~ist, making them capable of
these great deeds.71
·
Naturally because of these deeds, every young German would want
to join the

ss 1and

the Wehrmacht in order to stay a.live, would

adopt SS ideals,
Such thinking on the pa.rt of Himmler was difficult to keep·

1

'

76

Kersten! Op. Cit., p. 247-8,

77Ibid., p. 248-9.

r
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• from the Wehrmacht offices.

.

•:

Whei:eas at the time prior to the SA ,

purge, the Wehrmacht saw the SS as a small, weak, ally, it gradually

became aware of the growing power and influence of the

Verfugungstruppe-SS and. then the Waffen-SS.

Prior to the war,

there were many points of conflict between the two organizations
and many times Himmler had to go to Hi·tler to stop the restrictions which the Wehrmacht placed on the SS recruitments.

After

the war began and Himmler opened SS membership to ethnic Germans,
the Wehrmacht again sought to limit SS recruitment, but Himmler
"

had managed to tap this 'source .()f manpower J;trior to Wehrmaoht
control.
Friction between the SS and Wehrmanht was great before the ,
war, not only because of the drafting of men, but also because
of charges of SS spying and the usual friction between branches
of the armed services.

The interaction between the Party, Army,

and SS began in January of 1933, when General Blomberg of the
Army issued a decree which stressed the need for the destruction
of the old class concept in the army.
of the growing Party influence.

This was a direct effect

Blomberg who was often viewed

within Army circles as an idealist, went so far as to quote

~

Kampf on April 16, 1935, concerning the role of the Army in the
State.78

This in itself was a break in the Army's traditional

role of aloofness from politics.

78
i

l

~.
'

.

It was a victory for Hitler

O'Neill, Op. Cit., p. 64-6.
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who was attempting to break the power of the Army while still

General Fritsch who opposed the National Socialist ideology.
After General Fritsch was replaced by General von Brauchitsch,
~a

new era in Army-State relations began, for von Brauchitsch like;

Blomb$rg sought to make his subordinates adhere to the National
Socialist ideology.

In April, 19)4, Blomberg announced the in-

troduction of "Important Political Instruction ... which was special'
~

instruction in the ideology of the Nazi's allJled a:t the·regular

!
,

By January_- 30, 19}6, special political instruction for all~

army.

officer training schools, Staff Colleges and the Wehrmacht Academy was introduced, this instruction was given by Party special-'.
ists. 79
Despite these official sanctions., ·and the attempt at a unified front between the Army and the Party, there were serious
points of friction, especially as the power of the SS increased.
By the mid-19)0's, the<Army felt that the Party was encro?-ching
on its grounds and there were growing signs of resentment over
the policy of Party indoctrination.

Added to this were growing

numbers of clashes between 'the Army and members of the SA and SS,·
Members of the SA and General SS were of course, subject to army

79 rbid., p. 67-71. Near the end of the war, the equivalant
of political commisars were being trained in special schools.
Like the Soviet commisars, they were to be placed within the Army
to insure proper thinking and action.
·

duty and during their tour, many

SA

and

SS

men began reporting- to 1

their organizations as to the actions of their Army SUJ?erior$.
On D:;ce:r.ber 3, 1937, Rudolnh Hess wrote a directive that, " ••• no
Party members would be permitted to make reports on the Wehrmacht.1180
The period between 1935 and 1938 was critical as can be
seen by another directive by General Blomberg which stated his
hopes that the incidents could be corrected since they were bad
for civilian morale.

There

were~increasing

reports of Army en-

listed men being attacked by SS men and of Army officer cadets
being ordered about by SS 'men 'who claimed they had, " ••• police
authority over all Germans, and that includes soldiers."
a New Year's Eve celebration at

Or~nienburg,

During

there occurred a

massive brawl between local army and SS units.Bl
Perhaps the friction between the Army and pre-war SS can
best be seen from a statement by General Fritsch in 19.35;
While it was possible ••• to achieve a good, in many
cases even confidential relationship with all of
the officers of the Party, this was not the case
with the SS. This may be, when seen from .our side,
because there was scarcely a single senior officer
who did not feel that he was being spied upon by
the SS. Also, it became known again that, contrary
to the expressed orders of the Deputy of the Fuhrer,
SS men who were serving in the Army had orders to
report·on their superiors. 8 2
80ibid., p. 79-83.
8l!bid., p •. 99-100.
82

Ibid., p. 99; see footnote #76 for Hess' memo.
;
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The forr:Jcttion of the i·!affen-SS . led to a degree of confusion I

on the part of the Wehrmacht officers and also led to mistrust
within the German officer corps.BJ

The gradual but steady growth

,

of the Waffen-SS and their eventual priority for equipment and
new r:lanpo1·:er call-ups helped to form this aura of mistrust; the

g-ro1·;ing power of the SD also caused a certain degree of anxiety

on the part of the Wehrmacht officers.

As a rule, the SS men

took a superior attitude from the opening days of the war.

For

example, during the Polish campaign, an ...SS offtcer executed some

..

Polish prisoners and a Wehrmacht officer had him arrested •
•
Within a few days, .the SS officer was released and the fu~l im,pact of the legal wranglings of such men as Brigadefuhrer Scharfe:

.'
l

and the Fuhrer's decree of August 17, 1938 became known through- ·
out the Wehrmacht.

The German Army which had traditionally been

the arms bearer throughout German hist<?rY naturally resented the
new rival whose panzer di visions had an operating strength nearly;
double that of t.he Wehrmacht panzer divisions and whose commanders had more of a say so with Hitler than their
Staff.

o~m

Chiefs of

The attitude of the SS was constantly thrown in the face

o.f the Wehrmacht as in 1942 when the SS-Lei thefte published an
article which said in part,
In the past politics and the Wehrmacht have unfortunately often pursued d1ver~ent paths. The Waffen-SS

8Jott~ Dietrich, The Hitler I Knew (London: Methuen and
Co,, 1955), p. 92. Dietrich was Hitler's Reich press chief between 19JJ-'-!-5.
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provides the first example of indissoluble unity
between the two, in th::i.t concept and sword are
welded into one and pol1 tica.l det.erm1nat1on brin~s
such strength to
soldier's sword that it becomes invincible.

&Ue

In his book, Panzer Leader, General Heinz Guderian points
out the belief that Hitler formed the Waffen-SS divisions so that
~he

could be independent of the Army.

Guderian states that in the

¥

heat of the battles, the Wehrmaeht and Waffen-SS units were comH

ra.des 1n arms, and he is careful to make the distinction between i

i the
~

8

.

Waffen-SS and the SD units. 5

Other generals such as von

~ Manteuff!l wrote. slowing reports during the -war on the actions

i
~

~

i

of the Waffen-SS; yet in their post-war memoirs, they are careful ,

:,>

to mention the role of the SS units.

I

it .
'

I
'

I
!
l
)

t

Ir
~

~

t'

~

j~~---~~~~----------------84 auckhe1m, op. Ci t.s., p.
f
(

)

J14-5.

85Guderian, Op. Cit., p. 242-J.

CHAPTER VII

TH.E NSDAP - ITS NAKE UP AND STRUGGLE WITH THE BUREAUCRACY
I am including this section since the influence and power

i

t'

i of the SS and its replacement of the Party, to such a degree, 1s
t
'

,

tunusual in a totalitarian state ••. we should then know something

\ of the NSDAP and 1 ts struggle. to achieve ana. mainta.tn 1 ts power.
The NSDAPp:r:;ior to the seizure of power,. was organized d1f-

~

'
tferently
than the Soviet Communist Party, due to the different

!

•i circumstances
~

under which each operated.

In his famous work,

; "What is to be .Done?" which was published in 1902, V.I. Lenin

!.

~

I

· made cle!ar the basic
sheviks.

betwe.en himself and the Men-

In that famous work, Lenin called for a disciplined

~paramilitary

•

diff~rences

party which was made up of a group of professional

~

I revolutionaries and which operated on a clandestine level.
r:

l'

This

type of party was the logical result of the type of pol1 ti cal

'~ .

~system

in which it operated; the Czar's secret police and control

~

t of communications all made the open, democratic partie.s imprao~

f tical.

As a result, the Communist Party kept ~ts membership low

~and its quality high.

!

Ae a r~sult of this policy, the Party

i was able to fulfill 1 ts required tasks and the only elite which
~

! arose were the higher Party members.

ir
~

r
~

~

f;:.t:..~-·l>~ll'~~~~"Vw.-"<0<:.<; ..1t1~~~~~;•~:li1111liifl&'!\111-'...•lUll/illoGt...,,.a;;r.-ir_~...:.,o.~,'h"""°"'llo.l".o...,.~~~h- .. ~_,-~......~"':!:'A•~~~-";oa:'lU;;,•.......~~.I".'~.,<

'

48

The NSDAP grew and lived in .a different envirorunent however,•
for the weak Wein:ar Republic had to operate along. democratic
grounds.

After the unsuccessful putsch in Munich, Hitler real-

ized that his best path to power lie with using the legal means
available to him.

Thus his party had to be organized along dif-

ferent lines; his chief' lieutenant, Hermann Goering served as a
good public image, for, being an ex-war hero, he attracted support from many veterans and some members of the military.
Party platform which could be

he~rd

The

on street c·orners was direc-

ted at those elements in society who were or•who felt they were.
disfranchised.

As a result, the

.P~ty

i

in the early days and justi

prior to the seizure of power consisted of lower and lower-middle)
class elements as well as a few

ps~udo-intellect.uals.

The NSDAP

I

' could org·anize openly and its first stor::n troopers, the SA which
eventually numbered three million men,' was made up to a large
degree of the unemployed and the unemployable.

As a result of

the different environments, the differences between the Communist.
and the Nazi parties can easily be seen; the make-up of the Nazi
Party created problems for Hitler after he took power in 1933.
In most totalitarian states, the role of the party is one
of socialization of the masses and providing the future leaders.
Hitler, however, saw the state and party as having distinct and
separate functions.

.Hitler in 1935 said;

The task of the state is.: the continuation of the
historically developed administration of the state
organization in the realm and throu~h the means of
law. The task of theparty is first: development
of ••• stable cells of the National-Socialist teach-

l

l~9.

ing; second, the education of the total population
in the sense of the National-Socialist idea; third,
the delivery Of these educated to the ~tate for its
leaders and followers.~6
·
·
The party was not to be the state, but it merely was to prov:.de
leaders for the tr8ditional state structure.

While the party was

to .ev·entualJ.y pro1ri:le leaders to the state, attempts to gain
power by the party membership were on the whole unsuccessful.
1

Whereas a large degree of Hitler's success at the polls was the
result of street demonstrations and brutal tactics against opposition parties, the NSDAP offered little in the
tive programs.

~ay

of construe-

•

The NSDAP on the whole, preferred men of action

to men of thought.

Hitler's preference for followers can be seen
j

when he wrote;
They (the German Bourgeoisie} never understood that
the st:r.enrrth of a political party lies by no means
i~ the greatest possible independ~nt intellect of the
individual "Clembers, but rather 1-n the disciplined
obedience with wgich its members follow the intellectual leadership. 7
Since the NSDAP members were of lower or lower-middle class origins, they were impatient of delays, laws and due process., " •• all
of which stood between the 'popular will' and its achievement. •·88

86 E.N .. Peterson, "The Bureaucracy_ and the Nazi Pa'rty,"
The Review of Politics, xxviii (April, 1966), p. 174.

87
88

Hitler, Op. Cit., p. 457.
Peterson, On. Cit., p. 172.
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When the seizure of power took place, the Party members ran

1

into the bureaucracy 1·rhich ·had a long history and trad1 ti on of
service to the State.

The bureaucrat was a trained and conserva-,

tive element within the state and he often held a Masters or
Doctorate degree; thus with his special privileges, the bureaucratic group formed almost a class unto themselves and they had
little in common with the man on the street.
ltt first, few bureaucrats joined the NSDAP after the sei-

zure of power in 1933, but when it became clear that the NSDAP
would stay in,power, many bureaucrats joined. the 'Party for reasons of opportuntty.89

Although many.positions ann opportunities

were open to Party members, the low educational level of the
older.members made their placemel1t difficult.

On the other hand,

the later joiners consisted of ma:?.'ly white collar workers, the
weal thy, and the ex-noble classes.

Th.es·e later groups could not

be fully trusted and placed in high positions by the Party because they were seen as opportunists and not true believers. To
give high government offices to these late-comers would seem as
reward while the older members would be ,left out in the cold. 90
This inability of the Party to place trusted individuals in high
state positions seriously weakened the Party's ability to govern
Germany.

As a result, a further blow to the Party was dealt,

89 Ibid., p.

172.

90E.N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 16-17.

'
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but the struggle by the Party to gain power within the State
machinery raged until 1943.
The battle for power was especially strong from 19JJ-19J7,

I

when various laws were passed which were designed to eliminate
from the State machinery any elements whieh did not fit the
desired role or which could not support the National· Soc·ialist
program whole-heartedly.

Of course, the first elements to be

eliminated were the COIIL"D.Unist, Socialist and Jewish supporters.
With these individuals removed, beginning in 1933, the Party
made seYeral moves:_to fill key positions, bqt the Party members
were little morec:than figureheads and. could easily be sidestepped by the bureaucrats.

Even on the highest levels of gov-

ernment, of those Party members who entered Cabinet positions,

.

only half had the required legal training and the bureaucrats
continued to dominate the Cabinet.

Tbe·only real victory, was

the need for Party approval for promotions from one grade to the
next.91
One of the salient features of a totalitarian
its high degree of centralization.

regi~e

is

Every aspect of life within

the State must be controlled and supervised so that not only'the
economy, but also the individuals cannot deviate from the norm.
Such a deviation can cause dissent, a questioning of practices

91
p. 174-5

~-·:

1·.-..• -

.
Peterson, "The 13ureaucracy and the Nazi Party," Op. Cit.
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and procedures; the dissenters must be eliminated from the main- ,
stream of society.

To sustain centralization, a bureaucracy must

be used, and since the Farty could not fulfill this need in Ger-

many, other instruments had to be used, the first being the traditional State bureaucracy.

Hannah Arendt says that, " ••• the

Nazis simply retained the existing administration and deprived 1ti
of all power ••• 0 92 while the government lost much power, the
' bureaucracy and its continuing use of power would seem to refute
this

propositio~.

The bureaucracy did not, prior to Hitler's
~

1

I

seizure originate policy, but merely carried out policies decided:

i

by the legislative branch'·under th:e Weimar Republic.

Hitler

!

displaced the legislative branch, but the bureaucracy continued
to function and it carried out Hitler's policies.
.r

There is

little doubt that had the war gone differently, better trained
and educated Party members would have gradually replaced the
traditional bureaucracy, yet the bureaucracy still had a great
deal of power until 1943.
As the Nazis attempted to centralize their control, and as
various ministries and agencies surged toward 3erlin, the local
Party units often lost much of their influence.

Instead of

turning to local administrators for funds, the Party would have
to go all the way to Berlin for grants and many Party officials

I

!
9 Hannah Arendt, The Ori~ins of_ Totalitarianism, (New York::'
World Publishing Company, 19691, p. 397.
I
2

I
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co~~l~ir.ed

istries.

of

hnvin~

to cool their. heels in various Berlin min-

As Gaulei ter Sauc}:el, Reichstatth~ in Thuring1a

wrote,
••• (the Party virtues) initiative, decisiveness,
and joy in responsibility, the best legacies frcm
the fi~htin; years, are 1ncre~s1ngly entangled in
regulations and formalities.9~
Sauckel for many ::;e,ars corr.plained that the

~hstattl:al ter

l':ho

was supposedly tb.e personal representative of Eitler, was nearly
powerless in his owr.. area due to the increased centralization.

"
It is at. this point that the friction
between the Party and the
' growing SS begins to become noticeable, for Sauckel complains of
"

Himmler's supreme police comnand in Berlin.
0

!

Prior to the seizure;,

:

; there was often difficulty between.Party members and the police,
yet the Party once in power, could not exact their revenge.94
In 11arch, 1933, Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, was named
by Hitler as provisional chief of police in
began to penetrate the police forces.

~·!uni ch,

and the SS

Within one year, Himmler

controlled every regional police force in Germany and by June,

1936, he was made Chief of.the German Police.95

As Chief of

German Police, Himmler and the SS succeeded in overriding the

i

I
¥

1

93Peterson, '"I'he oureaucracy and the Nazi Party," Op. Cit.
p.

175-6.
94

Ibid., p. 175-77.

95Nolte, Op, Cit., p, 391.

t

I
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tro.ditional bureaucracy and the Party.

This was the first in-

st:l.nce in Gerrnn:r.y where an organization of the new regime superceded the State and it

~·:as

due to t?:.e different level of member-

ship which I shall discuss later.
Neanwhile the struggle continued as the I•11nister of the
1 Interior, Frick, embarked on a campaign to wrestle power from
the centralized "monster" in Berlin and return power to the
Landrat.

He urged the principle of Selbsrverwaltung (local self-

government) and after three years, a compromise was worked out
for a greater de.gree of local autonomy.

According to this com-

promise, the Party would lead the people .and have influence in
political matters, while the Landrat was given the task of state .

i administration.

The loop hole concerning the Party's· influenc-?

O\ter political matters was closed by the fact that "Each was to
keep out of the other's business. 11 96

Thus the Party was barred

from interferring in state affairs, hardly a positive factor in a
totalitarian state.
Due to pressure from the Gauleiters, many of whom were old
Party members, Hitler issued the "Decree of the Fuhrer for the
Simplification of the Administration."

This decree was an at-

tempt to decentralize the Berlin "monster."

Due to this decree,

Berlin would merely co-ordinate plans and would not have to okay
local requests for funds, etc.

This decree was never implemented

9 6Peterson, "The Bureaucracy and the Nazi Party," Op. Cit.,
p. 179-80.
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however, and the centralization gpew.97
The situation within the Party became so bad that by 19hJ,

Gauleiter Rover wrote that the Party had manag-ed to survive only
because of its older members.
I

These older members whom he

claimed were dedicated, merely had better connections close to

' Hitler so they could avoid much of the bureaucracy.

Rover also

co:nplained that the Party ho.d gro:m too quickly and that mar..y of ;
;, the members were luke-warm in their beliefs and were not true
National

Social~sts

•·

The Farty also lacked leadership and this

,

.

1

I

led to incompetence and weakness when dealing with local problems'
and the bureaucracy.

Durfr1g the war, the Fa:rty lost ground and

the populace was critical of the high standard of living of many
of the Party members, especially after Stalingrad.

The Party

also lost its influence in the Army and the Churches on the
whole, s.tayed relatively strong.98
Thus due to the low level of intelligence of the hard core
members and the distrust of the late joiners, the NSDAP was not
able to penetrate the State bureaucracy.

While the Party was

declining, the SS organizati'on was becoming stronger; Hitler and
Himmler saw the SS as the true wave of the future.

By 1937 the

NSDAP had sunk so low in its ability to cope with problems that

97Ibid., p. 181.
98 ibid., p. 181-3.

.'

•a1t-ler said, "I've totally lost sight of the organization of the

,Party."99

"

•If

I
r

!
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i
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Nyomarkay, Charisma and F'l.ctlona.11sm in the Nazi
!r Part;y:,99Joseph
(M1nneapo11s: University of 1'11nnesota Press, 1967),

I P• 138-40.
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CHAPTER VIII ·

THE DECLINE OF THE STATE MACHINERY
Dur,.ng the time that

H~mmler

was . attempting to bu11d up the

i SS, it was necessary for Hitler to negate any powers of the tra-

~

i d1 t1onal State machinery.

I' any
~

Hitler naturally dtd nat wish to share :

.

power with any governmental agency; he did, bowever, w1sh to

f create a State machinery which would respond to
~

i
t'

h1.§. will.

The success of Hitler towards this end was voiced by Himmler;

j in

a 1937 brochure entitled, "Dr. Wilhelm Frick and His

~
Ministry.~

J In that brochure Himmler wrote,

i·

f

The powers of the National Socialist police force are
directed towards implementing the will of the leaders
of the State and the protection of people and State;
they are therefore necessarily based, not uoon detailed
~ but upon the realities of the National Socialist
Fuhrer S,tate and upon the duties allotted to 1 t by the
leadership.
Like the Wehrmacht, the police can act only 1n accordance with the orders of the leadership and not according to laws.100
Himmler in the same year, went so far as to order the SS to

f
~

~

1
~

!

create a new political order and not merely to protect the old
one.

Such a creation was responsible to and carried out,

i
~

i

:j
~

100Broszat, Op •. Cit., p. 188

" •••

,-.:;.<~·:

'only on orders of the leadership.~01

,_;..;.. ,,-,.,, _.,,,.....;t.'

',;<

Thus Himmler felt that by

'.19J7, control of the State lay not in the traditional political
:sphere,
but in the hands of the
j

ss.

When Bitler,,came to power, his first year was spent attempJting to "stabilize" the governmenta1 structure, so as to el1minate 1
~opposition

from the legislature.

,was the Enabling Act of 24
vote of 441 to 94.

Mar~h,

A major step towards this end

1933, which was passed by a

Because of this act, the legislature lost

power to the cabinet, for the cabinet now had the p,ower to, •••
"
"d.e,part from constitutional prov1sions,and
t ~ interfere every-.

j
~
[.

!

l'rft.ere except in parl;iamentary institutions or with the f ed.eral
council. .. 102

Many of those who voted for the Enabling Act felt

that the safegUards within the Act would 11m1t its. use •

.

The main safeguard was thgt the Act was valid only as long
as the original federal cabinet was

re~alned.

The cabinet at that

time contained only three National Socialists out of twelve.

The '.

cabinet was changed shortly, however, when one non-Nat1onn.l Social,
t:

1st member was arrested for embezzlement and another resigned.
The Enabling Act stayed in effect, however, because various
National Socialist lawyers fought to retain it.

As one said,

It would bel1 ttle the, significance of the great
event of national concentration if we were to
enter upon a discussion of what would constitute
the premature end of the simplified legislative

101Bracher, op. Cit., p. 354.
102

Neumann, Op. Cit., P• 51.

~
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·.

~ '.'"

:· -~'._ ... ·..
..

~

process, whether the replacement of one person by
another in the cabinet or an·alterat1on of the
political composition of the cabinet.103

The failure of the legislature to act decisively, while the

1Nat1onal Socialists were still a minority, encouraged Hitler to
tpush through the National Socialist Plebiscite Act of 14 July,

;i933.

This Act was more of a propaganda act than a constitution- •

'.ally valid act, but it served its purpose by decreeing that only
;the cabinet could submit an intended enactment to the people.

•
! this

Itcould
i

As

was interpreted by the National Socialist lawyers, the people'

"

approve of an a~t.after it was enacted~

Even 1t 1t were

~ r!jected by the people, 1 t woUld still be valid because the .
~Fuhrer embodied the spirit of the people. 104
~

This Plebi sc1-te Act· marks an important turning point since
~.
~
~it

l.t
\
t
i

t

i

'.
i

openly r.efut1ates the democratic principles of the Weimar

j

:'Republic and clearly shows the relationship of the Fuhrer to the

t people.

The lawlessness of the SA street fights was now legalized,

~

; since the only cr1 ter1on for the val1d1 ty of an action was the
~
~

will of the Fuhrer.
The Fuhrer•s exact position, by 1938, was recognized even

t by foreign observers.

t
~

As James Pollock wrote,

The Fuhrer alone has the power and the responsibility
for the measures taken by the Third Reich.105

;;

103Ibid., P•
104
Ibid., P•
105
(New

52-J.
54-5.

James Ke·rr Po11ac k , Th e Governmen t o f Grea t er Germany
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,) p. 73.

York:
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Hitler did not stop with the reduction of the Relchstag, but
'attacked the local congresses.

On JO January, 1934, the statute,

reconstitute the Reich" destroyed the state diets by trans-

~"to

0ferring to the Reich, all sovereign power.
i/.

One year later, the

same action was taken against the municipal diets, so that with10?j

;in two years, complete centralization beyond law had taken place. ·
~

I
i

Jattacked.
~

~tory
!

" fire, the coUl'ts were also
was under
•
The oourts,11ke the Reichstag did not have a long his-

While the

B~ichstag

of independence.

Prior to the Republic, they had a history

'
iof
serving the Kaisar rather than the people.

I

They were con-

'

i

i

'

~

l.

;stantly having to yield to the influence of the Army and Civil
(

: Service •
••• a very close link existed between the legal profession and the stat~ machinery, so close that on
the average one jurist in two became a state official, and over half o~ all senior civil servants
were law graduates.10
f

As with the Reichstag, Hitler was beyond the law as he de-

t
~manded

'r
~.

~he

~
I

all judges to swear obedience and loyalty to himself.

As

said on 13 July, 1934;

f

r----~--~--------------~--~

i
f

106Ib1d., P• 78-9.

~

107Ne~mann, Op. Cit., P• 55.
108aichard Grumberger, The 12 Year Reich (New Yorks
8
Rinehart & Winston,) p. 116-7.

f

;

Holt,
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this hour, I was responsl.ble for the fat.e of., the
Gerrnn n!?.tion- A-n.d therefore -I was the supreme law
lord of the GerrJan people.109

~,··~·~·,,,.,,in'

Gradually under Hitler;
all judicial powers have been transferred from the
st9tes to the Retch, and all judicial officers have
become Reich officials.110
,'With
'

the transfer of the courts to the Belch, and with the Reich-

· stag becoming a

r~bber

stamp, any effecti v.e cheoks on Hitler be-

: came all but 1mposs1 ble.

~

The SS was not long in keeping 1 ts influence out o.f the

i; ootu'ts.

By

i unofficial

19)'9~·,the

watch" on the Ministry

~Justice offioial~y

f.'

..

.

SS magazine, "SchwarzeJr Korps" assumed an

or

Jl,lstice.

The Ministry

ot

~

l

published its own e.xchanges w1 th the

' "Schwarzes Korps" on contentious court decisions.

Many times the ~

i
;

"Schwarzes Korps" took the Ministry to task on d.ecisions.111
More basic methods were used to

~:

~
1:
'

~

~r1'ng

the legal profession

into line with the will of the Fuhrer.

~

All praotisi.ng lR-wyers were grouped together in the
Nazi Lawyers Association, the 'honor courts•, of
which were armed with formidable disciplinary powers;
members failing to 'Heil Hitler• faced severe reprimands; those.who failed to vote in Reichstag eleci
t1ons and plebiscites were excluded from the bar. 12

,-----~

.

f •

I

{

!09Pollock, Op. Cit., P•

J

llOibid., P• 86.

85.

111 Grwnberger, On. Cit., P• 119.
112
Ibid., p. 118.

.
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On 15 April, 1940, the RSHA, .the Reich Security Office of
~the

SS, felt safe enough in 1 ts power to decree that:
The lee:al validity of State Poli.ce regUla.t1ons does
not rest on the Reich President's ordinance of 28
February, 1933, for the Protection of People and
State; the powers required by the Gestapo for the
-execution of all measures necessary to their task
stem not fr~=±.. speci:(ic lo.ws and ordinances but from the
overall nission nllott~d to the Ger~an ool1ce in
gcncr?) e."ld··-th~ G-~i..~t~~;o in-t;";'"rttg_ul:J.r in connection

~

'

'
'

with the reconstitu~ion of the
State. 113

~ational

Socialist
!

iln short then, the Gestapo's power was based purel1 on the will of

..

While SD lawyers continued to justify actions in
•
}
!legal terms, suoh actions were only designed to pacify certain
~the
~

Fuhrer.

~elements
!
~

of the German populace.

As Martin Broszat wrote,
The State legal system having lost its authbrity
and the Stat~ administration machine its independence as a result of the impact of the F'uhrer' s
authority, the Fuhrer was able to·1nvest this
new executive frora time to time with the rights,
prerogatives and privileges of an official organization without at the same time subjecting
i,t to established state rules.

t.
'

The historical s1gnif1eanee of the SS was that, in its
capacity of Fuhrer's executive, it became the real
and essential instrument of the Fuhrer's authority.114
The proof of this view, was the fact that on 24 August, 1943,.
~Minister
r:
"

of the Interior Frick was demoted to Reich Protector of

f:Bohemia and Moravia and Himmler was given his job.
!
113Broszat,. Op. Cit., P• 190.
114

.
Ibid.,
P• 191.

Himmler thus
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oame

to

control, aside from the SS, the German civil-service

and annexed territories as well as the Party machinery,, sinoe
,the Gauleiters were governmental employees.

Thus through the

!waffen-SS Himmler re~ched into the Wehrmacht, and he became the
f political chief of the Reich Ministry of Justice.1 1 5

•
•

l

L

I
i

Il

i

L
!
~

.
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CHAPTER IX

LEADING PERSONALITIES WirHIN T.S:E THIRD REICH
There can be no doubt that certain 1nd1v1duals within the
: Third Reich had varying effects on not only the development of
~

i the SS, but the functioning of the State as a whole'•

Himmler's

I

~

l. personality and organizational ability when coupl,ed with that ot
" the head of the sA, Ernst Rohm, prior to the• 'Night of the Long

i
i Knives,'
i

Il the

SS•

naturally helped to determine the degree of success

or

After Hitler managed to consolidate his position, after

tthe SA leadership was decapitated, after the Army was brought
~under h1s~control

through

Gener~l

Blomberg, Hitler's world, and

those men who influenced Hitler and helped to run the State,
: began to close into an ever-decreasing circle.

Unfortunately, this circle was all but destroyed during the
~
~

final days of the Third Reich and the Nuremberg executions.
~either

Dr. Goebbels nor Reich Marshall Goering nor Himmler him-

self survived these events, and Martin Bormann, if he is alive,
certainly is not in a position to publish his memoirs.

Thus

reliable sources are narrowed to a small field, primarily· the
memoirs of Albert Speer and General Guderian.

Using these men's

memoirs and opinions, let us look at the men who were close to
Hitler and who had either real power or a chance at it indirectly
through their influence on Hitler.
LI,

•
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Heinrich Hifumler
Because of h1.s control over·the SS, 'Himmler; aside from
~Hitler,

was .1n all probability the most powerful man in Germany.

I
··At. tir.ies, Hitler may have felt thnt Himmler's ideas were a bit
I

unrealistic, but Himmler shm'led Hitler almost perfe,et devotion

'-and obedience and Hitler viewed the ·ss as his private force
;which could be relied upon in every situation.

rt we take

a look at the SS, we see that Himmler's mind was

j'

~a
j

combination of the absurd and the pragmatic.

His desires to

; repopu!Qte the East with German peasants and. to found frontier1

r

like outposts against the Asiatic hordes, seems in.direct contra-

'; diction t.o the mind which instituted the complex and effective
~

~files

kept by the Gestapo and SD, or the high esprit d' corps of

f
l

~-

t

i

'•the Waffen-SS main divisions.
General Guderian viewed Himmler as, "the m&st impenetrable
of all Hitler's disciples, ••• hls imagination was all the more
~vivid

and even fantastic.

planet. 11 116

He seemed like a man from some other

Yet Speer who dealt with Himmler more often, but in

a different capacity, .views Himmler as, " ••• a sober minded realist
who knew exactly what his far-reaching political aims were ••• His
office worked with the precision of a well-oiled machine - which
was probably an expression of his own personality."117

116Guderian, op. Cit., p. 374.
11 7Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York:
& Co. t 1970), P• 444.

This dis-

~

l

MacMillan
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; orepancy in views can, in part,

b~

accounted for in the difference.

in each man's contact with Himmler on a da1-to-day basis.

With

: the elit:ina.tion of the .SA es a. power factor, and w1 th the increase

f' 1n field strength oftbe
I resist any expansion by

Waffen-SS, the only armed group left to
Himmler was the Wehrmacht.

While, "there

~was certainly no friction what-so-ever in the front 11ne"118 be"'
~ tween the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS, this was not so behind the
~

'lines.

.

'

Both Hitler and he (H1rr.mler) distrusted the Army,
for.their intentions were d~rk, and there aiways
existed. the danget for them that 1f th~ Army rli
cognized them in time, 1 t might have resisted. ·9
While Himmler was loyal to Hitler, he was not a regular mem~ ber of the dinner c1rcle which hovered about Hitler.
e

come into the inner circle though, lying to

; him.

H1tl~r

When he did

was not beyond

For example, Speer had proof that .the SS was bu1ld1ng

i secret concentration camps and· stocking them with both foreign
~I

i and German labourers.
~

Many of these labourers were being pulled

from industries where they were badly peeded and Speer brought

~

.i

'

this fact to Hitler's attention.

When questioned by Hitler about

.i .
'

this, Himmler denied the report and Hitler was placated - the

~ camps continued.120

}

,,t

I
~J·

{

--------------118otto Skorzeny, during 1nt_erv1ew, Sept. 1972•
119Guder1an, Op. Cit.,, P• 375.
120 .
.
Speer, Op. C1 t., P• 445-6.

~
'

~

f,

f
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assuming control of the Vistula Army Group and its subsequent
failure to stop the Soviet advance, Himmler lost some favor in

I Hitler's eyes, although.,~ ••• everyone still feared:. Himmler •• 121
,.

Martin Borml\\nn
The concensus opinion on Bormann, unlike Himmler, is uniform •.
[ Putting 1 t bluntly, "No one in the party was so hated as Borman!~~
'

~ By constantly being next to Hitler• carrying out his wery wish

i and command and working hard, Bormann manag.ed to push his way into

il every
~c•

f;

facet of Hitler's life.

ll

He was in cha}'ge of Hitler's

personal finance.s, his date book, his correspondence and who could

I

iand could not see Hitler.

Eventually by screening those who saw

~Hitler, Bormann managed to successfully "edit" the news Jlh1ch
~
>

I. reached
'i

Hitler.

Bormann could not keep out Himmler, Goebbels,

'. Speer or other powerful men, but he co.uld keep out various

• Gaule1t1ers and other p$rty officials.
General Guderian viewed Bormann as, "next to Himmler, the

'

~most

sinister member of Hitler's entourage,"123 who hated the

:7

i army

and did his best to keep all "decent" people from seeing

~ Hitler. 124
~

f

Bormann had a constant battle with Dr. Goebbels, Speer, and

~

121tb1d., P• 506.

122Ib1d., P• ,552.
123Guderial!-'• Op. Cit., P• 376.
124
I,b1d.t, P• 376-7 •
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!to a lesser degree Goer1ng,·to vie for favorite positions vis-a-

•

~vis

Hitler.

Because of his close proximity to Hitler, he

;managed eventu9.lly to report various situations to Hitler and

If Hitler would agree, Bormann

ioffer an."objectlve" solution.

1would write lengthy memos which would carry Hitler's sanction.
!According to Speer, "de facto,

~ormann

was conducting the internal,

1arfairs
of the Reich ... 125
'•
Although he managed to reach a stage where he could have a
.1

!

serious effect on certain State matters, his unpopular! ty and

~lack of 1ntell1genee126 seriousl; hampered

i
iI

hj.m.

'.

Dr. Goebbels
Like Bormann, Goebbels was a long time follower of Hitler

f and stayed with him until

•
~

the

very end in Berlin.

.

.

Unlike Bormann, 1

; Goebbels was quite intelligent and mana.i;i;ed to make Hitler le.ugh,
; a tra.1 t which ende'ared him to Hitler
~

a~d·

his dinner circle.

;

~

Goebbels worked constantly to get rid of Bormann and sought allies

\

~·on

all fronts, but Guderian viewed him as a dangerous demagogue

:I

~

~and

a skilled and clever speaker who lacked the courage

t~

stand

~up to Hitler.'1 27 The problem with this comment on Coebbels'
i co~age, 1s that neither Bormann, Speer nor Goering stood up
~Hitler; few men possessed Guder1an's convictions or courage.
r

~

'

Like Goering, but not to the same degree, Goebbels indulged

i----------~~------~--~12
~

J
~
~

.~

f
~

to

5sp~er, Op. c1t. P• J02.

126Ib1d., p. 301.
12 7Guder1an, Op. Cit., P• 376.

-
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,

various pleasureB, the most common being the seduction

.

'Of unknown actresses; but again, his ability to entertain and
.

flatter Hitler kept him in favor despite BormAnn • s efforts.
Hermann Goering

i
I

128

. Another early follower of R.1tler• s, Goeri'ng was a fighter

¥pilot ace in World lhar I and brought a certain amount of prestige
;to the NSDAP When he joined.
~was

e

Between bouts with drugs, Goering

responsible for the development and growth of the

.

iAf'ter its development and initial

successe~,

Luft~~ffe.

however, he succumbed
;

.

I

Ito· his power and wealth, as well "as-drugs, and re.tired to Karin
IHall to fondle his.Jewels and ogl.e his paintings. 12 9

;

l

L

i)

~

It with

Goebbels often tried to enlist Goering's aid in his struggle

i

Bormann, but his fear of Hitler caused him to fluctuate.

~

[As Goering was in large part responsible for the· failures at
.:Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and Stalingrad, he sunk slowly
:;

~into

drugged stupor which was no·t reversed until after the war.

~

i

; Speer felt that Goe:ring "would have been the only person whose

f authority
~

t but
~

and popular! ty Hitler would have had to reckon w1 th, iJo ,

.

his activity and attitude during the war can best be reflected

f by an incident in August of 1944, when Hitler in Generals Jedls

I~and

t

Guderian's presence addressed Goering in the following terms:

¥

f

,--~~~------------------------

!
l

I

128speer, op. Cit., p. 312-3.
12 9Guderian, Op. Cit., P• 372-3.
130speer,

op.

Cit., p. 605.
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Goering t The Lu.ft;·1~'fr e•'°s .dofng nothing. it.'Is""
lon.R"er worthy to be an independent service.
And that's your fault. You're lazy.131

no

that point, Goering was quiet and began to cry.
General Guderian & Albert Speer
I do not feel that personality-breakdowns- on Geneial Guderian
. or Albert Speer are in order because Guderian, while ou-tspoken,

~

'

tw,-as 1n and out of official positions too often to build up a
~

2 sound

position and Speer, while an able Minister, controlled
i
~absolutely no armed force, and was relatively unknown to the

i; public.

Thus the pressures they "ccmld bring to bear would be at
•
j best 1rrat1c.

~

t

'
t
'

i
~

i

.

it

,-----------------w

fi

~

1J1Guder1an, Op. Cit., P• 373.

t
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CO!JCLUSION

I
'

Now the question

~Does

all this prove anything?"

~

m~st

be asked, "What does al.l this mean?"
Let u·s .summarize the preceding

I
l

I

sections and see what the answer is.
Firstly, it is clear that Himo.ler had a clear idea of what

~

;~ the role of the SS was to be 1n the new Germany. It was to pro~
"
~vide the futur~ leaders who~re to captain 1ndustxy, finance,

.

~

~

fa:rm1ng,

pol1t1c~·;ar;d

army.

From the pick of the German

popul~

ition, the purest Aryans were to be selectively bred and trained

~·so

'
l

they could continue the work begun by Hitler and lead Germany

.
into
a new Golden Age.

{i

Hitler, on the other

han~,

seemed to

t~. •

\

' gradually grow a dream; he firstly saw the SS as a party police
'

! force,
r"
I

but as time went on, as the SS under the careful guidance

. and loyalty of Himmler grew, Hitler saw the SS as the tool he

t

f could always rely upon.

tr

Here was an instrument forged from his

{ will for his use; here was the sword which would do away w1 th the
~)

!' intellectuals

and old noble class who had shunned him and whom

'f;·

i he mistrusted.
5

Ir
The SS was .not to be part of the Germa.n masses,
i rather to be bred and trained to lead, to ever cause
!~

~

i

image which the German people could look to.

I the
I

....

awe and an

Hitler's trust of

SS needs no further proof than the fact that 1 t was the SS

(who guarded his person, up to the very end.

ilL.•.,..,!:4~.;r;

but was
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to insure that the. SS would draw only from the
~best

~

~

cated

and that 1t would be separated from the m&sses, a compl1recruit~ent

f course,

and set of requirements were set up.

Of

not all of the SS was submitted to these standards; the

i

i Gestapo

section was a looal and secret police agency wh1oh was

..

?;

~

.

The General SS and especially the pre-war Vergugungstruppe
\ ..~·

i

It was important in

SS had to pass rigid physical .standards.

~ both Hitler's and Himmler's minds, that the SS be placed 1mmed1'
·~ ately above the rabble
'
of the SA, for if' standards were relaxed,

'

0

t

~ the elite character of the SS would be lost •

.I•

A pro.blem did arise when the war broke out, tor the General

(

;:

t SS was largely swallowed by the Wehrmacht, and the Vergugungn

strupne SS - now renamed the Waff en-SS - was rapidly expanded and
recruits had to be found.

The fact that the General SS was

t,

i. drafted
~

into the Wehrmacht was not all negative,. for a glance at

I the diary of Wilhelm Pruller will

show that the political 1ndoo-

f tr1nat1on received prior to the war was carried into the Wehr-

l macht units and this pol1t1cal1z1ng had to have an effect on the

I

other men.

While new recruits did not receive the political in-

1::::::na::::r::

·:::e:e:~::::::P::c:::n:h:1::f:::-::~:d1c1al

I system not subject to Wehrmacht control,
I
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Getting back to the training of the Ver:fugungstruppe

_,.-_,,,,.,..,__~

.. >•

ss,

~

I it

was intended to produce a closeness unequalled in the Wehr,, mach t • The complex 1n1t1ation rights coupled with the length of

'
~,

I
i

t group, both by
I

-~he

general public and the old noble classes and

disenfranchised intelligensia who (~locked__. to both the General SS

I and

the SD branches.

-

Thirdly,if we look a.t the various bran,ches'of the

ss,

we

ca.n see that there was ll2 aspe.ct of p1,1blic or private life that

the SS did not control or investigate.

I" eral

i

police work, undercover police work, the press, the NSDAP,

i foreign
t

Politics, religion, gen-

.

.

i

territories, matters of German legality, economics,

general security, secret weapons, fore.1gn relations, munitions,-

!,

ii the

secret service and front line secur1 ty (including Wehrmacht

~

,

~ 1ntell1gence and desertions) were all in the hands of the

' No law, no legal barrier stood in the way of the SS;

I
·.
I
E

asid~

ss.
from

over 500,000 men 1n uniform, the SS had countless informers 1n
both pr1 vate life and governmental pos1 t1ons.

An important question arises when we look at SS-Wehrmacht

~

."

- ~

r frictions.

. ~ .~

At the front lines, especielly as the war went on,

~

J Wehrmacht units were more than happy to have Waffen-SS units

!
t

next to th~m.

i did
~
~

Behind the lines there was friction, for not only

the SS men feel superior and not only did the "Head-HUJtt~rs"

i have unquestioned authority, but also the Wehrmacht officers
•

f

t
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','

'resented the priority given to the Waffen-SS for men and
By

material.~

the end of the war, only the Waffen-SS tank divisions were

i

·effective,
for the Panzer divisions when smashed were given lower
.
f pr1or1t1es for refitting.
,

We must now ask a hypothetical question to further test the
i

: power of the SS:

could'~>the

!i

~

;warren-SS units?

Wehrmacht units have disarmed the

It's a difficult question, but I would say no.

fF1rst of all, there was no Wehrmacht central command; General
~

'iKeitel.was not capable of indepeqdent action; General Model
I
,
.
f, showe,d hi:ltlself a capable officer., but again, Afraid to face H1 tler

t). or

the SSmtn aroun4 him; General Guderian was a strong man and

~

*~perhaps capable of action, but. could he have co-ordinated Wehr•
'macht action before the SS reacted. Since the SS controlled ·com-

'
~

mun1eat1ons and the 1ntellig-enoe service, action of this sort

,r would have been difficult.

t

~is

Ev,en if Germany had( won the war, there

the problem of disarming the Waffen-SS units.

Himmler would

~have been reluctant to do so, and the action of Sepp Dietrich in
~

tHungary showed that he was fully capabie of independent action,
~

even against Hitler. It is difficult for any group, especially
.
Ian elite group to submit to orders which would endanger or lower
~
~

f

f their standing.

1:

i

I

Next we come to the NSDAP and the struggle with the

~

c bureaucracy.

r

j assume

i

~

It 1s clear that the Party proved itself unable to

positions of power mainly because the oldest members, and

~therefore

&

f

!.

the most reliable were 111-suited to the struggle w1th

the· 'Qureaucracy.

Al so, Hitler saw the Party, like the SA, as a

t.'>l·-1.:t~.;,_~~:'t".!<Jc''·'•.UJ.!jl;~.'O.~/l"~·.e~"\>\ll4'"-~A~•};i\.·,.~;,,.':">1::;~,·~""~•>ttli'U:<:~:"'*~·"ll.>·~·'·'"'S--.~ .ws~~·H:•,~c~·i..,..,7,;.:.•;,r.,z.!;-'"1f.~lik.~;'. "'°"'"~; A"l;iAl"'<:.t'~·:. ·:,$'U'~. ~\'~i'!.'!'SO"J<.•.,-~;.i:.-~\.;~·¥·,;i;.,_,_,: ,;,
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•
tool to reach his goal, and once ;reached, to be left alone.

The

\Party struggled with and lost its battle with the State bureau; cracy because H1 tler did not g1 ve 1 t the Sllpnort 1 t needed.

f when

But

the struggle was finished, Himmler was made M1n1ste~ of the

tinterior, and at one blow, the Party, the State bureaucracy and
}·

~ the State Judicial syste:n came under h:ls direct control.

Again,

'Himr:iler moved 1n and began to consolidate his control.
~:::,

;

W1th the Wehrmacht, Party, and State bureaucracy weakened,

who could have offered serious resistance to the SS within the
~
t Stat0 ? Could Dr~ GOeb.bels, Bormann or Goer1tig? Th:,e answer 1&::/'a
f:

i

·

1

I

~·

1

I"
~

~

clear no.

f

.F1r:.atly, if Hitler had died• a power struggle

Why?

.

~for his replacement would have taken place.
Bormann could not
i~ .
.
i have won, because he was hated;"b,y Dr. Goebbels, Goering, Himmler

;~ and the .Wehrmacht.

1

It is possible that either Goe-ring or Dr.

~Goebbels could have "seized the Crown".· but, what real, concrete
~

ipower did they have?

Did either of them have 500,000 men under

t'.

or the State machinery in their back pocket?

~arms,

Goering was

~

;.

i

i openly laughed at 1n the streets and "what could Dr. Goebbels do to'
1:

~
f,

command respect; what could he do to enforce his laws? The single
.
~man who held the trump card was Himmler; Speer said that everyone;
~

r feared him, and what could they do to him? If he were eliminated,

I~ the
•

head of the Gestapo or Dietrich could step in and they hae

f power.

I

f which
I

!

It is·true _that Himmler was not part of the dinner circle

i

included
Dr. Goebbels and Bormann, but while they were at
.

~

teach other's throats, while Dr. Goebbels amused Hitler, Himmler

ii
I\
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aconsolidated his hold on the occupied territories and the Gestapo '
'•''.

: grew.
~

There was one man who could cower Himmler, and that was

fH1tler

himself, but while Himmler was not the bravest of men, he

'

jshowed himself capable of independent action, when he forced
~skilled

~out

'"
'

Germ.an labourers into his factories and when he sent

independent peace feelers to the Allies.
Ot course, this is all speculation, but the tact remains that·

ithe SS (1) trained its personnel to assume responsib111ty and
i
i' command, (2)

'

"
.
it controlled evert:, vital functton of the State and

t (3) unlike the SA·or the NSDAP, there -was leadership in depth
~

~1n its ranks.

~the

~

It was possible for the Wehrmacht to move against

SS, but such a move would have torn the entire German Reich

~apart.

The Wehrmacht showed 1 tself 1no~pable of such independent

i

iaotion and there was s1mply no power base strong enough to root
~

:out the SS from German society until the entire Relch crumbled.

'~:;

I

i W1 th 1 ts front line di visions smashed,·· the factories in ruins · ·
and occup1 ed by fore 1 gn powers , the SS d1 ed, but wl. th 1n Germany

~until

i~

1945, it was sovereign.
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APPE>IDIX # III

TABLE OF SS· RANKS

:B::tITISH ARMY
(Approx. equivalent)

SS

\flank)
Rei chsfuhr~r SS ·
OberstgruppenfUhrer
Obergruppenfuhrer
Gruppt!mfuhrer
Br1gadefuhrer
Ob<?rt\'.threr
Standartenfuhrer
Obersturmbannfuhrer
Sturmb!\hnftihrer ·
Hauptsturmfuhrer
Obersturmfuhrer
Unte'rsturmfuhrer
Sturmseharfuhrer
Haupt·scharfuhrer
Oberscharfuhrer
. Unterscharfuhrer
!: Rot tenfuhrer
i Sturmmann
~ Obersehutze

i

Schutz~

UNITED STATES ARMY
(A~prox. equivalent)

General of the Army
General
Lieutenant General
Ma.Jor General
Brigadier General
Brigadier "
Senior Colonel
2en1or Colonel
Colonel
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
Major
Captain
Captain
Lieutenant
1st Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
2nd Lieutenant
Regimental Sgt. Major Serg.eant Major
Sergeant Major
Master SerP:eant
Quartermaster Ser,ge~nt Technical Sergeant
Sergeant
Serp;ea:nt
Corporal
Corporal
Lance Corporal
Corporal
Senior Private
Private First Class
Private
Private
Field Marshall
General
Lieutenant General
Major General

I

j.

I!
j

J

~

!

i Source:

Heinz Hohne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 652.
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